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THE COLOR OF ALGORITHMS:
AN ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED RESEARCH
AGENDA FOR DETERRING ALGORITHMIC
REDLINING
James A. Allen*
ABSTRACT

Modern algorithms are capable of processing gargantuan amounts
of data — with them, decision-making is faster and more efficient
than ever. This massive amount of data, termed “big data,” is
compiled from innumerable sources, and due to decades of
discrimination, often leads algorithms to arrive at biased results that
disadvantage people of color and people from low- and moderateincome communities. Moreover, the decision-making procedures of
modern algorithms are often structured by a homogenous group of
people, who develop algorithms without transparency, auditing, or
oversight.
This lack of accountability is particularly worrisome because
algorithms are beginning to be deployed more rapidly and more
expansively by public and private actors. Recent scholarship has
raised concerns about how algorithms work to perpetuate
discrimination and stereotypes in practically all areas, from casually
searching the internet to criminal justice. This Article explores how
algorithms in the housing arena operate, or have the potential to
operate, in a manner that perpetuates previous eras of discrimination
and segregation. By specifically concentrating on algorithms used in
housing finance, marketing, and tenancy selection, this Article
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provides a research agenda for exploring whether housing
stakeholders are creating an era of algorithmic redlining.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................221
I. “This is the Procedure”: A Brief History of Algorithms, from
Byzantine to Boolean .......................................................................225
II. Algorithmic Redlining: The Threat of Autogenerating
Segregation ........................................................................................230
A. Potential Harms of Discriminatory Credit and
Lending Algorithms ..............................................................235
1. Credit Card Scoring and Algorithms Giving Access
to Loans ............................................................................237
2. Algorithms Used in Reverse Redlining, Subprime
Mortgages, and Payday Loans .......................................239
3. Discriminatory Algorithms in Housing
Advertisements and Marketing .....................................241
B. When You Can’t Buy, Rent: Affordable Housing and
Rental Housing Selection Algorithms ................................246
1. Improper Preferences in Affordable Housing
Algorithms .......................................................................248
2. Rental Housing Algorithms ...........................................252
III. Policies and Solutions: Looking Back and Looking Ahead .......253
A. Transparency: Promoting Choice and Accountability
Through an Understanding of Automated Decisions ......256
B. Auditing Algorithms for Fairness .......................................258
C. Human Oversight and Autonomy: Algorithms as a
Method of Retaining Free Will ...........................................260
D. Other Reforms and Modernizations ...................................262
1. Improvements to Intellectual Property, Data
Protection, and Internet Law .........................................262
2. Adjustments to Internet Law .........................................265
3. Modernizing Public Administration..............................267
4. Changes by Private Actors .............................................268
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................269

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

221

After the lecture, when the judge said, “I’m going to give you boys
another chance,” I don’t know why or what happened, but I heard
myself say, “Man, you not givin’ us another chance. You givin’ us
the same chance we had before.”
-

Claude Brown, MANCHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND 1

Harlem, New York

INTRODUCTION
Algorithms, or automated decision systems, are being used by
public and private entities to optimize efficiency, cut costs, and
expand social welfare. 2 Although beneficial in many respects,
algorithms deployed by public and private actors also make decisions
that go against our better instinct. 3 Algorithms are now being used in
the affordable and fair housing arena — to ensure equitable results,
these algorithms must be implemented with transparency, auditing,
and oversight. 4 This Article explores the potentially inequitable uses
of big data and algorithms in the housing arena and suggests how
different actors in the United States may be perpetuating a previous
era of “redlining.”
In its most technical sense, the term “redlining” can be traced back
to the 1933 practice of racial discrimination stewarded by the United
States government’s Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC). 5 At

1. CLAUDE BROWN, MANCHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND 118 (1965).
2. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 52–61
(2013); Kevin Slavin, HOW ALGORITHMS SHAPE OUR WORLD (TEDGLOBAL 2011),
https://www.ted.com/talks/kevin_slavin_how_algorithms_shape_our_world
[https://perma.cc/R9ZY-Y2WY]; THE SECRET RULES OF MODERN LIVING:
ALGORITHMS (BBC Four 2015) (detailing algorithms built by private entities and
deployed by the aviation administrators to assist in coordinating plane arrival and
departure; detailing a matching algorithm created by academics to connect those in
need of organs with organ donors).
3. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 1–13 (2017); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE,
ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 12–14
(2018); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 1–13 (2016).
4. Nestor M. Davidson, Affordable Housing Law and Policy in an Era of Big
Data, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 278 (2017) (discussing how data is used to focus on
outputs, such as the number of units that can be constructed from a given investment
or management property jobs, but should instead focus on outcomes, “the actual
short- and long-term consequences of policy interventions for those served by
affordable housing programs and the communities at issue”).
5. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA viii (2017) (describing
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the time, the HOLC was the nation’s largest financer of federallybacked government loans, lending to individuals and families to buy
homes. 6 However, the HOLC did not disburse these governmentbacked loans equitably — the agency would literally draw red lines on
maps around communities of color, which they identified as too risky
to serve. 7 This practice etymologized what became widely known as
“redlining,” as underwriters across the country followed suit in an
attempt to adhere to the federal government’s “risk-evaluation”
standards. 8
As the practice of redlining expanded, so did its meaning. The
term “redlining” has since become more encompassing and is now
commonly considered to describe the general practice of an
institution’s refusal to provide resources and financial support to
areas considered “high-risk.” 9 Unfortunately, these “high-risk” areas
remain disproportionately those with properties owned by people of
color, due in large part to the previous era of technical redlining.10
Though the housing industry has moved away from maps and red
pencils, “redlining” and its historical impact remain relevant today.
This Article cautions that overreliance on automated, algorithmic
decision-making systems may perpetuate housing segregation through
“algorithmic redlining.”
In line with the modern, broader
understanding of redlining, this Article uses the term “algorithmic
redlining” to encompass sets of instructions — simple or complex —
which carry out procedures that prohibit or limit people of color from
how racial segregation became de jure policy of the federal government in the
context of housing).
6. Id. at 63–67.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 65–67 (describing how the Federal Housing Administration’s
Underwriter’s Manual required racially segregating procedures).
9. Redlining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT FACT SHEET n.1
(2014),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/fact-sheets/pubfact-sheet-cra-reinvestment-act-mar-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9H8D-D4UY]
(“‘Redlining’ refers to the practice whereby lending institutions refused to offer
home loans in certain neighborhoods, based on the income, racial or ethnic
composition of the area. The term ‘redlining’ stems from some lenders’ practice of
using a red pencil to outline such areas.”); Barbara A. Kleinman & Katherine Sloss
Berger, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975: Will It Protect Urban
Consumers from Redlining, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 957, 957 (1977).
10. Redlining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9. Unfortunately, this
Article addresses redlining only as a backdrop to how it has informed and created the
data that impacts modern algorithms. For a persuasive, detailed background on
redlining’s perverse impact, see Richard Rothstein’s The Color of Law: A Forgotten
History of How Our Government Segregate America is a tour de force. See generally
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5.
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procuring housing or housing financing, particularly in non-minority
neighborhoods. 11 Algorithmic redlining and the original era of pencil
redlining are synchronized in a crucial way: both result in the
exclusion of minority and low-income members of society from access
to adequate housing. 12
This Article explores the impact and potential harms of
overreliance on automated decision systems, specifically in the
housing equity context, and proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a
brief history of algorithms, from their origins as a basic set of steps to
complex, autonomous procedures. This includes a discussion of the
rise of “big data” and an exploration of how machine learning has
intensified the proliferation of automated decision systems. Part I
also addresses some of the recent concerns about algorithms as
expressed by community activists, academics, and lawmakers — as
algorithms become more expansive, so too have concerns about their
adverse impact on society. A discussion of this history is important in
understanding how pencil redlining was, in a way, an algorithm:
“area” plus “colored people” equals “do not lend.” It is also
important to appreciate how redlining resulted in adverse
consequences for people of color, consequences that make up the
data modern algorithms use to generate decisions.
Part II begins with a brief discussion of the importance of access to
housing equity, and then offers a research agenda to explore how
algorithmic redlining has the potential to exacerbate existing
segregation. This Part examines the use of algorithms in three
particular areas of the housing market and explores the segregation
that can result when algorithms themselves are discriminatory. The
first, and perhaps most important, area is that of housing finance —
because of biases built into automated credit evaluation and mortgage
lending decisions, algorithms act as initial barriers for a subset of
people attempting to access credit and housing finance. 13 This initial
barrier to financing comes in the form of scoring systems that rate the
riskiness of credit and mortgage applicants, as well as algorithms used

11. “Algorithmic redlining” is left intentionally broad and generally means any
computational process that operates to curtail a person or family’s access to housing
based on race and/or socioeconomic status.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See, e.g., Aaron Glantz & Emannuel Martinez, Kept Out: For People of
Color, Banks Are Shutting the Door to Homeownership, REVEAL (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-shutting-the-doorto-homeownership/ [https://perma.cc/L4M9-SMN5].
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to target minorities and low-income individuals for usurious loans.14
By reviewing initial reports of systems that rely on these kinds of
algorithms, it is possible to see that they result in disproportionately
negative lending practices towards people of color. 15 The second area
of potential biases is found in the algorithms that direct advertising or
marketing towards different races.
While present research
concerning online advertising in the housing ownership and rental
market is scant, bias in other areas of online discriminatory marketing
is reason for concern. 16 Finally, the third area of potential bias is in
unfair algorithms that may be used in the housing selection process.
This is exhibited by recent calls of housing advocates for reform in
offline affordable housing lottery algorithms 17 and in the algorithms
used to evaluate private market rental applicants. 18
Part III reviews previous reforms and discusses how these once
beneficial policies are outdated in the modern, online housing
economy. This Part borrows from previous policies to suggest various
ways in which the adverse impacts of algorithmic redlining can be
curbed: transparency, oversight, and greater human autonomy in
automated decision-making. These suggestions draw on previous
legislation in the United States and contemporary legislation in the
European Union, while also advocating for reforms previously put
forth by academics and stakeholders, who call for a modernization of
laws impacting the areas mentioned above. While some of these
reforms may seem improbable, particularly given America’s political
climate, this Part discusses why these laws are really commonsense
and necessary to protect the modern consumer.

14. Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized Consumer
Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 121, 124 (2009); Andrea Freeman,
Racism in the Credit Card Industry, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2017).
15. Cassandra Jones Havard, “On the Take”: The Black Box of Credit Scoring
and Mortgage Discrimination, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 241, 241 (2011).
16. O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 68–83 (describing predatory and biased online

marketing).
17. Ethan Geringer-Sameth, ‘Community Preference’ Lawsuit at Center of
Affordable Housing, Segregation Debates, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 29, 2017),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/city/6838-community-preference-lawsuit-at-center-ofaffordable-housing-segregation-debates [https://perma.cc/4N4A-HGAE]; Keaton
Norquist, Local Preferences in Affordable Housing: Special Treatment for Those
Who Live or Work in a Municipality, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 207, 207 (2009).
18. Eric Dunn & Merf Ehman, Rental Housing’s Elephant in the Room — The
Probable Disparate Impact of Unlawful Detainer Records, 65 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 35,
40 (2011).
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I. “THIS IS THE PROCEDURE”: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ALGORITHMS,
FROM BYZANTINE TO BOOLEAN
In their simplest form, “algorithms” are processes that rely on a
specific set of steps to consistently produce the same result. 19 When
an entity with knowledge of how a given procedure functions conveys
this information in a step-by-step formulation, it can reproduce the
steps or particular method of analysis for the given criteria as an
algorithm. 20 Once conveyed in this way, anyone can apply data to the
algorithm, and the results remain predictable. 21
In a sense, algorithms have always been an engine that drives
societal advancement. Some of the earliest algorithms were used to
advance community and economic development by conveying how to
build infrastructure or how to determine the rate of carried interest
on a potential investment. 22 For example, early societies used
algorithmic methods to manage the crucial practice of water
management: if a person knew the length, width, and height of a
certain area, with the appropriate algorithm, that person could use
that data to build a cistern. 23 If a person knew they had capital
commitments from potential investors for their cistern-building
business, with the appropriate algorithm, they could take the
investor’s pledged commitments and calculate their potential carried
interest. 24 These basic examples are not too different from those used
in recent history or even today.
While ancient algorithms are similar in their objective to today’s
algorithms, the latter are obviously far more complex. 25 Modern

19. Algorithm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “algorithm”
as “[a] mathematical or logical process consisting of a series of steps, designed to
solve a specific type of problem”); see also DAVID BERLINKSKI, THE ADVENT OF THE
ALGORITHM: THE IDEA THAT RULES THE WORLD xvi (2000).
20. See, e.g., THE SECRET RULES OF MODERN LIVING: ALGORITHMS, supra note 2.
21. See DONALD E. KNUTH, SELECTED PAPERS ON COMPUTER SCIENCE 191–94
(1996).
22. See id. (describing the ancient Babylonian practice of using algorithms to
convey methods of building infrastructure and calculating carried interest and rates
of usury). These ancient algorithms frequently concluded with the same post-amble:
“This is the procedure.” Knuth points out that the common use of the phrase, “This
is the procedure,” is proof that these were algorithms — a way of denoting a
particular process meant to produce the same result at a time when algorithms were
yet to be defined. See id. at 188.
23. Id. at 187.
24. Id.
25. M.D. Atkinson, The Complexity of Algorithms, in COMPUTING TOMORROW 1
(Ian Wand & Robin Miller eds., 1996); John F. McGowan, Complex Algorithm
Research and Development: Harder Than Many Think, MATHBLOG.COM (July 20,
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algorithms are tremendously intricate and take many forms. Most
relevant to the discussion here are “machine learning” algorithms,26
which are informed and powered by “big data.” 27 In a broad sense,
big data is the process of aggregating massive amounts of information
from various online platforms and data capturing entities for the
purpose of identifying potential patterns; machine learning algorithms
are a form of artificial intelligence, which operate to process big data,
learn from it, and then perform tasks and analytics. 28 These are such
well-known terms that they have become buzzwords, as popular as
they are opaque and complicated. 29
In essence, increasingly invasive modern algorithms — deployed by
private businesses and governmental actors alike — use sophisticated
computer technology and aggregated sets of data to generate
By
automated decisions and assumptions about individuals. 30

2009), https://mathblog.com/complex-algorithm-research-and-development-harderthan-many-think/ [https://perma.cc/GA5R-EMGB] (discussing the complexity of
modern algorithms).
26. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638
(2017) (describing machine learning systems as those “that derive their decision rules
from data rather than from code written by a programmer”).
27. See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014); see
also Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and
Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217,
1219–20 (2017) (“Big Data, too, is just a feature of the Algorithmic Society. In fact,
Big Data is just the flip side of a society organized around algorithmic decisionmaking. Big Data is the fuel that runs the Algorithmic Society; it is also the product
of its operations. Collection and processing of data produces ever more data, which
in turn, can be to improve the performance of algorithms. To vary Kant’s famous
dictum, algorithms without data are empty; data without algorithms are blind.”).
28. For further reading concerning big data, see The Big Data Conundrum: How
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Oct.
3,
2013),
to
Define
It?,
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/519851/the-big-data-conundrum-how-to-defineit/ [https://perma.cc/828Q-QDC7]. For further reading concerning machine learning
algorithms, see Nikki Castle, An Introduction to Machine Learning Algorithms,
DATASCIENCE (June 29, 2017), https://www.datascience.com/blog/introduction-tomachine-learning-algorithms [https://perma.cc/N7N3-2SB3].
29. Jackie Snow, An A.I. Glossary, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/business/an-ai-glossary.html
[https://nyti.ms/2AgdiSh] (discussing and explaining many of these buzzwords).
30. Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, Looking Up in the Data-Driven
CPI
ANTITRUST
CHRON.,
May
2017,
at
5,
Economy,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CPIStucke-Ezrachi.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA56-GLWL] (quoting Tim Berners-Lee, a
founder of the World Wide Web, who distinctively points out that “[t]hese sites make
more money when we click on the links they show us. And, they choose what to
show us based on algorithms which learn from our personal data that they are
constantly harvesting.”).
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gathering personally identifiable information and optimizing data
aggregating techniques, big data is able to reform and refine
algorithms, making them more efficient and producing more
“rational” decisions. 31 Modern machine learning algorithms are now
being used for everyday purposes, making automated decisions about
matters concerning everything from leisure to subsistence. For
example, Netflix uses a machine learning algorithm to suggest what
shows a viewer may wish to add to their queue, 32 and New York City
wants to use an algorithm to automatically enroll individuals in
welfare benefits. 33
Though efficient and socially productive, the race to create and
deploy algorithms may come at a cost. 34 For one, it is possible that
enhancing efficiency through algorithms is coupled with overt
invasions of privacy. 35 One popular example of such privacy invasion
took place in 2012, when a Target algorithm inadvertently served as
one woman’s publicized pregnancy announcement. 36 Target became
the subject of public scorn when one of its automated decision-

31. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 52–61.
32. Tom Vanderbilt, The Science Behind the Netflix Algorithms that Decide
WIRED
(Aug.
7,
2013),
What
You’ll
Be
Watching
Next,
https://www.wired.com/2013/08/qq_netflix-algorithm/ [https://perma.cc/2TFJ-MBDA]
(describing the algorithms that suggest movies and shows on Netflix).
33. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., Int. 0855-B (2018) (a bill to use computer algorithms
to auto-enroll New York City residents into eligible benefits plans).
34. Donald Knuth — considered the father of the modern algorithm and the
“Yoda of Silicon Valley” — has warned that “premature optimization is the root of
all evil,” and in discussing modern algorithms, said that he is “worried that algorithms
are getting too prominent in the world.” Siobhan Roberts, The Yoda of Silicon
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
17,
2018),
Valley,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/science/donald-knuth-computers-algorithmsprogramming.html [https://nyti.ms/2GjaIjp]. See also Davidson, supra note 4, at 279
(describing how data-driven policy, in examining outputs, is creating a “positive
feedback loop”); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of
Ethical Algorithmic Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 134–35 (2017)
(summarizing the debate regarding “faulty algorithms”).
35. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015) (“Surveillance cameras, data
brokers, sensor networks, and ‘supercookies’ record how fast we drive, what pills we
take, what books we read, what websites we visit. The law, so aggressively protective
of secrecy in the world of commerce, is increasingly silent when it comes to the
privacy of persons.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due
Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
36. Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her
FORBES
(Feb.
16,
2012),
Father
Did,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teengirl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#6a9c5c3c6668
[https://perma.cc/S8TL5TDD].
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making algorithms, which utilizes big data, concluded that a customer
The company sent her family promotional
was pregnant. 37
advertisements for pregnancy and baby products — before her father
was aware that she was expecting. 38
Additionally, the lack of transparency in how various public or
private actors utilize algorithms has been a major cause for concern
among academics, legal advocates, and lawmakers. 39 Transparency
issues are often bifurcated into two conceptually different types of
algorithms. First are “source code algorithms”; developed by private
entities and often deployed by public agencies, these algorithms are
immune from disclosure because their code is protected under the
harbors of trade secret laws. 40 Second are complex “machinelearning algorithms” or “neural-network algorithms,” which, while
also enjoying trade secret protection, are opaque in a different sense;
these algorithms are fed data and then arrive at decisions
autonomously, making transparency difficult even if mandatory
disclosure were required. 41
In addition to being criticized for their invasiveness and opacity,
algorithms are criticized for being racially biased. 42 These criticisms

37. Id. Target’s marketers identified potentially pregnant women by mining
buying patterns like cocoa butter, calcium tablets, and larger purses that could hold
diapers. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Decision & Judgment at 1–5, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Law Sch.
v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 160541/2016, 2017 WL 6610414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27,
2017) (finding that the New York Police Department had to produce documents
about its predictive policing algorithms to the Brennan Center at New York
University School of Law under a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request); see
also Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-taught-to-explainitself.html [https://nyti.ms/2hR2weQ].
40. See generally PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 1–18; see also Danielle Keats
Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1292–93 (2008)
(describing how Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) regulations exempt trade
secrets).
41. David Grossman, How Machine Learning Robots Teach Themselves,
POPULAR
MECHANICS
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/robots/a14457503/how-machinelearning-lets-robots-teach-themselves/ [https://perma.cc/ETR5-AFPS]; Kroll et al.,
supra note 26, at 638 (reflecting on the difficulty of regulating machine learning
algorithms and the decisions they produce).
42. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING
VALUES
7–8
(May
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_repor
t_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TEB-UCXJ] [hereinafter BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES]; Megan L. Brown et al., ACLU Suit Attacks Computer Fraud and

Abuse Act to Investigate Website Discrimination Using Controversial Online
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are largely advanced under two theories — that modern algorithms
are built using decades of discriminatory data, and that they are
created by a homogenous fraction of persons with inherent biases. 43
Ample research has shown that by using biased data and potentially
biased code, algorithms are creating a funneling effect that
perpetuates discrimination and stereotypes. 44 Understanding the
importance of bias in algorithms is crucial as we shift to what internet
law scholars have dubbed the “scored society” — a culture driven by
evaluating people based on shadowy metrics and ratings. 45
Complainants have recently started alleging that biased algorithms
are generating biased scores, which are then used to influence or
make decisions in a range of important matters such as criminal
justice, distribution of social services, evaluation of public employees,
and even influencing democratic elections. 46 Like so many of these
Tactics, BLOOMBERG BNA: ELECTRONIC COMM. & L. REP. (July 13, 2016) (discussing
an ACLU suit that alleges discriminatory practices in “scraping” data and using
digital “bots”); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 34, at 133–35.
43. Bryce W. Goodman, Economic Models of (Algorithmic) Discrimination 1–2
(29th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems) (2016),
http://www.mlandthelaw.org/papers/goodman2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HV4-PTRZ];
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 684 (2016); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (“Because humanbeings program predictive algorithms, their biases and values are embedded into the
software’s instructions, known as the source code and predictive algorithms. Scoring
systems mine datasets containing inaccurate and biased information provided by
people.”); Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of
Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 86 (2017) (“While data
analytics is touted for its ability to reduce human biases, it often merely replicates
them.”); Kate Crawford, Opinion, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y.
TIMES (June 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificialintelligences-white-guy-problem.html [https://nyti.ms/28YaKg7] (describing how
coders building algorithms are often white males).
44. Davidson, supra note 4, at 279–80; Madden et al., supra note 43, at 64–67;
Jahna Otterbacher, New Evidence Shows Search Engines Reinforce Social
Stereotypes, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 20, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/new-evidenceshows-search-engines-reinforce-social-stereotypes [https://perma.cc/8NQQ-SMQW].
45. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 4.
46. See generally EUBANKS, supra note 3 (conducting an analysis of how
automated decisions perpetuate inequality); Tanvi Misra, When Welfare Decisions
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
15,
2018),
Are
Left
to
Algorithms,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/virginia-eubanks-automatinginequality/553460/ [http://perma.cc/KB7S-BW2B] (reviewing Eubanks’s book); see
also Filtering Practices of Social Media Platforms, Before the H. Comm. on the
114th
Cong.
(Apr.
26,
2018),
Judiciary,

https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20180426/108231/HHRG-115-JU00-WstateBlackburnM-20180426.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HNC-CKPT] (statement of Chairman
Rep. Marsha Blackburn); Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Where Countries Are
Tinderboxes and Facebook Is a Match, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018),
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other areas, automated decisions in the housing arena are not
immune to the biases found in big data processing. 47
As we begin to rely more frequently on algorithms to make
decisions in sensitive areas of public policy, including the increasingly
important area of housing, it is important that those algorithms are
not only efficient and accurate, but also equitable. 48 Beginning with a
brief overview of the importance of housing and homeownership, the
next Part of this Article suggests a research agenda focusing on how
cryptic algorithms may be used at various levels in housing
procurement to perpetuate deep physical segregation within society
— this is algorithmic redlining.
II. ALGORITHMIC REDLINING: THE THREAT OF
AUTOGENERATING SEGREGATION
Housing and homeownership are important to the American public
for several reasons. 49 For one, owning a home is considered a reliable
asset, and home equity is often cited as an important factor in helping
Additionally, housing and
families enter the middle class. 50

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/world/asia/facebook-sri-lanka-riots.html
[https://perma.cc/EKL8-7WCB] (examining how Facebook can influence elections
and cause public unrest); see, e.g., Pitch v. Lightbourne, 221 Cal. App. 4th 480, 484
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (plaintiff challenged a computerized benefit platform that
allegedly produced erroneous benefit terminations); Hous. Fed’n of Teachers v.
Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (teachers
alleging they were inappropriately fired due to an algorithm that evaluated
performance).
47. See Davidson, supra note 4, at 279–80; Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair
Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349, 361 (2017).
48. BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 42, at iii (“ . . . [b]ig data
analytics have the potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in how
personal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health, education, and
the marketplace. Americans’ relationship with data should expand, not diminish,
their opportunities and potential.”).
49. William M. Rohe & Mark Lindblad, Reexamining the Social Benefits of
Homeownership After the Housing Crisis, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD., HARV.
UNIV. 6–9 (Aug. 2013), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/hbtl-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3KTR-LZ5D]; Beneficial Impacts of Homeownership: A Research
Summary, HABITAT FOR HUMANITY 1 (2016), http://www.habitatbuilds.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Benefits-of-Homeownership-Research-Summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZL3U-7ATK]; Michelle Higgins, Homeownership, the Key to
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2013),
Happiness?,
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/realestate/homeownership-the-key-tohappiness.html [https://nyti.ms/1dr7q3j].
50. Pamela M. Blumenthal & John R. McGinty, Housing Policy Levers to
Promote
Economic
Mobility,
URB.
INST.
2015,
at
5,
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/71496/2000428-housing-policylevers-to-promote-economic-mobility_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5GH-BHE8]; U.S.
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homeownership determine where one lives, which often correlates
with a host of other factors such as where one goes to school (thus
significantly impacting on the quality of one’s education 51), the
quality of health, and overall quality of life. 52 Nevertheless, both
owning and renting property can be prohibitively expensive. 53 This
creates a problematic dichotomy: affordable housing and
homeownership are simultaneously vital and out of reach for most
Recognizing this, lawmakers have attempted to
Americans. 54
facilitate greater homeownership in the United States by introducing
policies that make home financing, home marketing, and affordable
housing procurement accessible to a larger portion of the American
public. 55 Though commendable in theory, many of these policies

Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., Paths to Homeownership for Low-Income and
EVIDENCE
MATTERS
(Fall
2012),
Minority
Households,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/fall12/highlight1.html
[https://perma.cc/BW4A-Z7B7].
51. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., How Housing Mobility Affects
Education Outcomes for Low-Income Children, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Fall 2014),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/fall14/highlight2.html
[https://perma.cc/G9HG-GMXF]; Mary Cunningham & Graham MacDonald,
Housing as a Platform for Improving Outcomes Among Low-Income Children, URB.
INST. 1–2 (2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25331/412554Housing-as-a-Platform-for-Improving-Education-Outcomes-among-Low-IncomeChildren.PDF [https://perma.cc/C3ZH-J72D]; Jonathan Rothwell, Housing Costs,
Zoning, and Access to High-Scoring Schools, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 19,
2012), https://www.brookings.edu/research/housing-costs-zoning-and-access-to-highscoring-schools/ [https://perma.cc/BB8U-BHDC]; Ben Chapman, Kids from Poorest
Neighborhoods Left Out of City’s Elite Schools, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2018),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/education/kids-poorest-neighborhoods-leftcity-elite-schools-article-1.3911218 [https://perma.cc/FT5X-7Q4B] (describing how
students from the poorest schools in New York rarely make it into the City’s elite
schools).
52. Dalia Streimikiene, Quality of Life and Housing, 5 INT’L J. INFO. & EDUC.
TECH. 140, 140 (2015); Rohe & Lindblad, supra note 49, at 8; Beneficial Impacts of
Homeownership, supra note 49, at 1.
53. A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 196, 207 (2009); Maria La
Ganga, Ordinary People Can’t Afford a Home in San Francisco. How Did It Come to
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
5,
2016),
This?,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/05/high-house-prices-san-franciscotech-boom-inequality [https://perma.cc/85W6-9XFJ]; Kyle Munzenrieder, 81 Percent
of Miami Millennials Think Home Ownership Is Too Expensive, MIAMI NEW TIMES
(Apr.
15,
2016),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/81-percent-of-miamimillennials-think-home-ownership-is-too-expensive-8393251 [https://perma.cc/5XYVLGGK].
54. Dickerson, supra note 53, at 189.
55. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2012); Community
Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691 (2012); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
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have had a deleterious impact, directly segregating neighborhoods in
two ways: by making the benefits of these policies available to only a
select few, and by concentrating investments and the infrastructure of
these policies according to demographic. 56
Consider, for example, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which was
established with the goal of promoting homeownership for a greater,
more diverse group of people. 57 The FHA undoubtedly identified an
important hurdle for minorities attempting to access housing, 58 but
scholars have argued that by not accounting for the impact that prior
racial discrimination and segregation had on income inequality, the
FHA did not go far enough in expanding housing access for
minorities, thus benefiting only the select few who were lucky enough
to accumulate wealth during the era of pencil redlining. 59
Moreover, as Caucasian-American families migrated to the
suburbs — often after accumulating wealth from home equity
unavailable to minorities during the era of pencil redlining — public

56. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 65; Philip Tegeler & Michael Hilton,
Disrupting the Reciprocal Relationship Between Housing and School Segregation,

JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD., HARV. UNIV., 2017, at 4–6,
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/a_shared_future_disrupting_reciprocal
_relationship.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HRG-HT62]; see also Kleinman & Berger, supra
note 9, at 958 n.7; Ira Rheingold et al., From Redlining to Reverse Redlining: A
History of Obstacles for Minority Homeownership in America, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 642, 645–47 (2001); Adam Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership:

How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made
Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J.

186, 189–90 (2005) (examining how the wealth-building opportunity of the Fair
Housing Act was not shared with African Americans during the FHA’s first three
decades); Connor Dougherty, Tax Overhaul Is a Blow to Affordable Housing
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
18,
2018),
Efforts,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/business/economy/tax-housing.html
[https://nyti.ms/2DIPsna] (discussing how the tax overhaul will more likely benefit
developers rather than affordable housing tenants and advocates); Adam Looney,

The Early Results of States’ Opportunity Zones Are Promising, but There’s Still
Room for Improvement, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 18, 2018),

https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-early-results-of-states-opportunity-zonesare-promising-but-theres-still-room-for-improvement/ [https://perma.cc/4B9F-6GSW]
(discussing how the designation of “Opportunity Zones” galvanizes gentrification).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
58. Id. §§ 3604(a), (b), (c).
59. Gordon, supra note 56, at 189–90; Walter F. Mondale, Opinion, Walter
Mondale: The Civil Rights Law We Ignored, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/opinion/walter-mondale-fair-housingact.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FAffordable%20Housing
[https://nyti.ms/2v3uF8n] (one of the co-authors of the FHA reflecting on how the
government failed to use it for the benefit of those most neglected by society — lowincome communities and communities of color).
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and private investment migrated with them. 60 Public infrastructure
projects, including the development of residential subdivisions that
often enacted racially-restrictive covenants, were concentrated in
predominantly Caucasian-American neighborhoods. 61 Additionally,
private lenders, though legally prohibited from discriminating based
on race in credit evaluations, still used race as a factor for mortgage
applicants. For example, consider the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) — legislation enacted following the era of pencil redlining
that fostered a series of regulations designed to curb racial
discrimination in lending. 62 One of those regulations, 12 C.F.R. §
1002.6, 63 specifically prohibits lenders from using race as a metric in
evaluating credit applicants, yet section 1002.13, titled “Information
for monitoring purposes,” specifically requires mortgage lenders to
account for race:
(a) Information to be requested. (1) A creditor that receives an
application for credit primarily for the purchase or refinancing of a
dwelling . . . shall request as part of the application the following
information regarding the applicant(s): (i) Ethnicity, using the
categories Hispanic or Latino, and not Hispanic or Latino; and for
race, the aggregate categories American Indian or Alaska Native,
Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander, and White . . . . 64

Consequently, over the last several decades, segregating housing
policies, particularly those that deal with housing finance, have
greatly tilted the playing field by systematically disenfranchising
communities of color. 65 Racially isolating housing policies have also
exacerbated segregation according to socioeconomic status, forcing
low-income families and individuals into inadequate living conditions

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 115–37.

Id.

15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6 (2017).
Id. § 1002.13.
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 65; see also DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT
TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 87–108 (2015) (discussing segregating policies and discriminatory
lending practices); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 9, at
1 n.1; Gordon, supra note 56, at 206–07 (describing regulations that denied most
African Americans the opportunity to buy homes); Matthew Desmond, How
Homeownership Became the Engine of American Inequality, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May
9,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/magazine/how-homeownershipbecame-the-engine-of-american-inequality.html [https://nyti.ms/2pZnWIB].

234

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

such as slums, areas with poorly performing schools, deteriorating
recreational facilities, and underfunded hospitals. 66
The segregating policies discussed, one of which was pencil
redlining, have greatly influenced modern algorithms because they
generated massive data sets that consist of decades of information
built on exclusion and discrimination. When modern algorithms rely
on these databases to make automated decisions, they engage in
algorithmic redlining — reproducing, reinforcing, and perpetuating
preexisting segregation. 67 The coming subsections examine precisely
these algorithms, which make determinations in housing finance,
marketing, and housing selection. This Article describes how these
automated decision-making systems operate and explains their
potential to operate in today’s scored society in a manner that
furthers segregation.
First is an overview of perhaps the most important form of
algorithmic redlining: algorithms operating in the sphere of housing
finance. 68 Algorithms that determine an applicant’s creditworthiness
are of utmost importance, as they serve as a functional gatekeeper to
the funds necessary to procure housing. Second is a discussion of
algorithms used in online housing marketing. 69 As mentioned, with
the increased use of internet advertising to find housing, it is
important that the algorithms that act as editors of what options
consumers view are not corrupted by biased search characteristics.70
Finally, there is a subsection analyzing housing selection algorithms,
which can act as barriers to available housing and are a key part of
anyone’s access to affordable and inclusive housing. 71 Unfortunately,
many algorithms that assess and determine housing procurement are
tainted by biased data and segregating weighting techniques. 72 These
three issues — finance, marketing, and selection — are not meant to
be an exhaustive list of the forms of algorithmic redlining that may
perpetuate segregation. Rather, this Article aims to show that

66. REINHOLD MARTIN ET AL., THE ART OF INEQUALITY: ARCHITECTURE,
HOUSING, AND REAL ESTATE—A PROVISIONAL REPORT 30 (2016).
67. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
68. See infra Section II.A.
69. See infra Section II.A.3.
70. See infra Section II.A.3.
71. See infra Section II.B.
72. See infra Sections II.A and II.B.
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research into, and monitoring of, each is critical to fostering truly
integrated communities across America. 73
A. Potential Harms of Discriminatory Credit and Lending
Algorithms
Banks have relied on “consumer data” to determine an applicant’s
creditworthiness as a guise to discriminate based on race for
decades. 74 As previously mentioned, the United States pioneered the
practice of race-based credit evaluations as early as 1933, when the
federal government’s HOLC would draw red lines around AfricanAmerican neighborhoods and communities of color that were
identified as “too-risky to serve.” 75 The government’s overtly racist
practice of redlining became commonplace in America, as
underwriters across the country drew lines on their maps to follow the
U.S. government’s “risk-evaluation” standards. 76

73. For example, tax appraisal algorithms may serve to perpetuate segregation
and unfair housing policy. See Scott M. Stringer, Growing Unfairness the Rising
Burden of Property Taxes on Low-Income Households, OFF. OF THE N.Y.C.
COMPTROLLER (Sept. 6, 2018), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/growingunfairness-the-rising-burden-of-property-taxes-on-low-income-households/
[https://perma.cc/4VHA-APBJ]; Rebecca Diamond & Tim McQuade, Who Wants

Affordable Housing in Their Backyard? An Equilibrium Analysis of Low Income
Property Development, J. POL. ECON. 5, 5 (forthcoming 2017),

https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/LIHTC_spillovers.pdf. [https://perma.cc/CHW6UXD8]. Similarly, gerrymandering algorithms may identify households by race in an
attempt to predict voters who have the ability to elect policymakers that could, once
in office, change discriminatory housing policies. See MICAH ALTMAN & MICHAEL
MCDONALD, AMERICAN GRIDLOCK 55, 59 (James A. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka
eds., 2015); Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Identifying and Remedying Racial
Gerrymandering, 8 J.L. & POL. 345, 354 (1992). Zoning algorithms, though only
briefly discussed in this Article, may be used in ways that perpetuate segregation by
encouraging single-family developments rather than multi-family developments. See
S. McCauley & S.J. Goetz, Mapping Residential Density Patterns Using MultiTemporal Landsat Data and a Decision-Tree Classifier, 25 INT. J. REMOTE SENSING
1077, 1084 (2014). Algorithms that perpetuate segregation should be considered a
form of algorithmic redlining and must be scrutinized accordingly — this work
focuses on a particularly salient subset of these kinds of algorithms.
74. See DAVID MURAKAMI WOOD, UNDERSTANDING SPATIAL MEDIA 226–32
(Rob Kitchin et al. eds., 2015); Kenny Malone & Robert Smith, Episode 798: The
Bad Credit Bureau, PLANET MONEY, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2017/10/06/556212654/episode-798-bad-creditbureau [https://perma.cc/C7UV-3E5F] (“In 1874, if you wanted to buy groceries on
store credit, the cashier would reach under the counter and pull out a little blue book.
Inside would be your name, profession and whether you paid your debts on time. It
was the beginning of the Equifax business model.”).
75. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 63–67.
76. Id.
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Redlined neighborhoods were usually urban areas housing people
of color. 77 In these neighborhoods, financially qualified community
members were denied consideration for credit or mortgages because
of their skin color, or even because they lived near a person of
color. 78 Construed as an objective model to determine efficient
lending, the U.S. Federal Housing Administration openly used
redlined maps to inform computational evaluation algorithms for
risk-rating calculations, racist cartography, and discriminatory tax
Building upon these discriminatory evaluations,
appraisals. 79
government funded public works and institutional investors were
encouraged to direct their investments in white areas and disinvest
from black communities. 80 Eventually, these race-based investment
decisions became self-actualizing: by making it nearly impossible for
black communities to obtain access to equitable housing finance,
people and neighborhoods of color were forced into adverse financial
circumstances and adverse living conditions. 81
Today, the consequences of the era of redlining have stained the
“big data” that determines conditions for housing financing. For
example, scholars have recently made persuasive arguments that
there have been racist practices in the credit reporting industry, which
produces metrics that evaluate a person’s ever-important credit
score. 82 Similarly, academics have raised concerns that race-based
evaluations play a role in determining mortgage rates for borrowersof-color, an industry that heavily relies on credit scores. 83 Algorithms
making biased choices regarding housing are also exhibited in
analyses of the Great Recession, which saw an era of “reverse
77. Alex Rosenblat et al., Data & Civil Rights: Consumer Finance Primer, DATA
& SOC’Y RESEARCH INST. & OPEN TECH. INST., 2014, at 1,
http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2014-1030/Finance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84N3G9R9].
78. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 65 (“The [Federal Housing Authority] judged
that properties would probably be too risky for insurance if they were in racially
mixed neighborhoods or even in white neighborhoods near black ones that might
possibly integrate in the future.”).
79. Id. at 169–72; see generally Jennifer Light, Discriminating Appraisals:
Cartography, Computation, and Access to Federal Mortgage Insurance in the 1930s,
52 TECH. & CULTURE 485, 485–522 (2011).
80. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 93–137 (discussing the impact that redlining had
on communities of color).
81. Id. at 109–13, 153–75 (discussing the impact redlining had on obtaining
affordable housing, economic inequality, and intergenerational mobility).
82. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 92; Freeman, supra note
14, at 1071–72; Havard, supra note 15, at 241.
83. Madden et al., supra note 43, at 81; Rosenblat et al., supra note 77, at 3; Oren
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 38 (2008).
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redlining” — a shorthand for the practice of targeting African
Americans for the hyper-lending of subprime mortgages. 84 Finally,
consumer protection scholars and advocates have also alleged that
algorithms have been used as a tool to predatorily target low-income
people of color for the solicitation of highly usurious “payday loans,”
adding to the barriers of financial hardship. 85 Importantly, each of
the abovementioned practices relies on algorithms to limit access to
desperately needed housing financing for communities of color.

1.

Credit Card Scoring and Algorithms Giving Access to Loans

A credit score is a metric that lenders use to evaluate a person’s
creditworthiness — a determination of whether it is safe to grant a
loan to an applicant because she can be trusted to fulfill the
obligations of that loan. 86 Traditionally, credit scores are compiled

84. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 83, at 66–67; Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime
Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in
Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 173

(2009) (“Indeed more than half of the mortgages taken out by African-American
families in 2005 had subprime features (as compared to the industry average of 20%),
and 40% of Latino families taking out mortgages in 2005 were also subprime
borrowers.”); Fisher, supra note 14, at 123–24.
85. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 83, at 44 (“Payday loans provide another
example of a credit product that can impose substantial costs on imperfectly informed
and imperfectly rational borrowers. This consumer credit product is designed as a
short-term cash advance offered at a fee. In a typical transaction, a consumer might
pay a $30 fee for a two-week $200 cash advance. The fee structure of payday loans
makes it difficult for consumers to compare directly the costs associated with a
payday loan to the costs associated with other consumer credit products. In the
typical payday loan described above, the $30 fee corresponds to an annual interest
rate of almost 400%.”). See generally UPTURN, LED ASTRAY: ONLINE LEAD
GENERATION
AND
PAYDAY
LOANS
8
(2015),
https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2015/led-astray/files/Upturn__Led_Astray_v.1.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/27VK-XYW7] [hereinafter LED ASTRAY].
86. See generally Credit Card Redlining: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on

Consumer Affairs of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
96th
Cong.
189,
244
(1979),
United
States
Senate,

https://archive.org/details/creditcardredlin00unit
[https://perma.cc/4FEV-9EC4]
(statement of Gail S. Rubino, National Retail Merchants Association, arguing that
credit scoring based on geographical location is not considered redlining); Danielle
Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 295 (2007) (exploring how an
individual’s creditworthiness is critical to market identity and being a full, free person
in the modern age); Havard, supra note 15, at 241; Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit

Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic Quagmire or How the Lack of
Transparency in Complex Financial Models Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C.

DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87, 88–89 (2011); ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE: NEW
DATA, UNDERWRITING, AND MARKETING IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETPLACE
1,
4
(2014),
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using sets of data mainly pertaining to a person’s financial
transactions. 87 However, like many other modern algorithms, credit
scoring algorithms are beginning to include data points that go
beyond personal financial transactions. 88 Using “big data,” credit
scoring firms claim that they will be able to make more accurate
assessments of creditworthiness. 89 Unfortunately, like the redlined
maps of the 1930s, many of the data points that algorithms use to
generate credit scores have a disproportionately adverse impact on
low-income communities of color, and, in some instances, even on
those who patronize establishments in those communities. 90 For
example, American Express came under scorn when customers
complained that, even though they had successfully made credit
payments, their scores were tarnished for shopping at establishments
where other patrons are considered less “creditworthy.” 91
Such biased miscalculations are particularly worrisome because
many industries use credit scores to assess whether someone qualifies
for crucial needs such as housing financing. In the mortgage industry,
lenders frequently rely on credit scores to determine whether to
approve mortgages to home seekers, and to determine what rates of
interest to charge when making loans. 92 If credit scores are being
generated using suspect, race-related data, such scoring operates to
the disadvantage of communities of color by restricting access to
equitable lending. This is particularly true as computer algorithms
begin to heavily rely on zip codes to score society, because zip codes
are often tied to race and socioeconomic status. 93

https://www.upturn.org/static/files/Knowing_the_Score_Oct_2014_v1_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SX5Q-WLUQ].
87. See Julius Adebayo & Mikella Hurley, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data,
18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 159, 179 (2016).
88. See id. at 160.
89. See id. at 163.
90. See id. at 151.
91. See id.; O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 156–57.
92. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, The Freedom to Fail: Market Access as
the Path to Overcoming Poverty and Inequality, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 44
(2017); Jonelle Marte, Here’s How Much Your Credit Score Affects Your Mortgage
Rate, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/getthere/wp/2016/11/17/heres-how-much-your-credit-score-affects-yourmortgagerate/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dab31a344b39
[https://perma.cc/84N3G9R9]; Rosenblat et al., supra note 77, at 3, 6.
93. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic
Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2018); Emily Badger &
Quoctrung Bui, Detailed Maps Show How Neighborhoods Shape Children for Life,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/upshot/mapsneighborhoods-shape-child-poverty.html [https://nyti.ms/2OrqCLI].
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Without access to housing finance, communities of color are
restricted to rental options, diminishing (if not eviscerating) their
opportunity to build equity through homeownership. 94 Even if
biasedly-scored applicants are able to obtain mortgages, their interest
rates will be higher — thus, they will likely be restricted to
purchasable properties in low-value and low-income areas, which are
often isolated from booming job markets and other desirable
characteristics. 95 Ironically, as evidenced by post-mortems of the
Great Recession, lenders use modern algorithms as a tool to target
people of color whom lenders had determined to be more susceptible
to high-interest loans. Thus, although credit scoring algorithms are a
potentially biased barrier in accessing housing finance, other
algorithms are used to target minority, disproportionately low-income
applicants with financially burdensome loans. The ways in which
algorithms have been used to burden minorities through reverse
redlining, subprime mortgages, and payday loans is discussed in
further detail in the coming section.

2.

Algorithms Used in Reverse Redlining, Subprime Mortgages,
and Payday Loans

As academics and consumer advocates started to diagnose the
causes of the Great Recession, many began to suggest that part of the
problem was the emergence of “reverse redlining.” 96 Reverse
redlining is the practice of targeting minorities with home loans that
have steep interest rates and complicated compliance provisions. 97
Irrespective of the biased metrics that generate poor creditworthiness
ratings, in the leadup to the Great Recession, algorithms were used by
lenders to target African Americans chasing the dream of
homeownership; in reality, however, these lenders were burdening

94. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 182; Sarah Molseed, An Ownership Society
for All: Community Development Financial Institutions as the Bridge Between
Wealth Inequality and Asset-Building Policies, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
489, 490 (2006); Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 67–68 (2006).
95. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 110–11.
96. See RAYMOND BRESCIA, HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN
INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF POPULATION FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND
INEQUALITY 20 (2016); O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 40; Brescia, supra note 84, at 173;
Fisher, supra note 14, at 126–27.
97. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 126–27; Bryce Goodman, Discrimination, Data

Sanitisation and Auditing in the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 493, 501 (2016); Rheingold et al., supra note

56, at 651.
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them with nightmare loans. 98 These minority individuals and families
were often more willing to accept subprime loans because they were
less familiar with lending practices and more desperate for housing
finance, factors that are repercussions from the previous era of
redlining and biased creditworthiness evaluations. 99 Moreover,
because of the extremely high premiums attached to these loans,
chances of default were more likely — defaults led to foreclosure,
foreclosures led to evictions and vacancies, which created slums
riddled with poverty, crime, and a general worsening of the quality of
life. 100 Worryingly, these predatory lending practices have not ceased
since the Great Recession. 101 Rather, they have taken new form in
algorithms used to target vulnerable populations through the
solicitation of highly usurious “payday loans.” 102
Like subprime mortgages, payday loans are usually targeted at lowincome, less educated American populations, who are often unable to
understand the complicated interest rates and hidden fees attached to
payday loans. 103 In a sense, the disproportionate disbursement of
payday loans to low-income communities of color is the premier
example of the ills of redlining, both pencil and algorithmic. Like
subprime mortgages, targeted communities accept payday loans
because of the desperation for financing, as indicated by the
exorbitantly high interest rates they are willing to accept — this
desperation is a product of pencil redlining, when no financing
Algorithms only exacerbate this
whatsoever was available. 104
problem because they target and market payday loans specifically to
low-income communities of color, learning from preexisting data that
residents in those communities will be more willing to subscribe to
Unfortunately, because these
their usurious disbursements. 105
communities are often underfunded and neglected, schools tend to

27.

98. See IMMERGLUCK, supra note 65, at 89–90, 106; Fisher, supra note 14, at 126–

99. See IMMERGLUCK, supra note 65, at 107.
100. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 186–87; Rheingold et al., supra note 56, at
651–52.
101. See Jack Smith IV, This Is How Payday Lenders Dodge Google, Target the
Vulnerable
and
Exploit
the
Poor,
MIC
(Nov.
6,
2015),
https://mic.com/articles/128057/this-is-how-payday-lenders-dodge-google-target-thevulnerable-and-exploit-the-poor#.vfMlKly0W [https://perma.cc/J72S-VSUD].
102. See id.
103. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 83, at 44; LED ASTRAY, supra note 85, at 3;
Smith, supra note 101.
104. O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 81–82; Dirty Money: Payday (Netflix, Jan. 26, 2018).
105. Rheingold et al., supra note 56, at 651, 651 n.61.
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perform poorly, leading to a less educated populous that is often less
likely to be aware of a payday loan’s usurious impact. 106
In sum, when the lending industry relies on automated, algorithmic
decision-making systems, it also relies on biased technologies that
disproportionately target and score minority individuals and their
Biased targeting and scoring
families more negatively. 107
technologies thus limit access to housing finance, which in turn
narrows the scope of where minority individuals and families can
search for housing.
Moreover, because biased algorithms
disproportionately target minorities and low-income individuals,
these already marginalized populations are forced to limit their
housing searches to properties in communities that have homes of
lesser value — communities, as it often turns out, already populated
by minorities and other low-income families. 108 These communities
are continually neglected, leading to a lack of wealth and investment,
which results in living conditions that are inadequate and unstable.
Consequently, persons of means — composed primarily of nonminorities — avoid searching for housing in these areas, further
exacerbating preexisting segregation. 109

3.

Discriminatory Algorithms in Housing Advertisements and
Marketing

The previous section detailed a basic agenda for researching
algorithmic redlining in the context of access to housing finance. This
section discusses another form of algorithmic redlining, home
searching algorithms, and details the importance of why further
research and scrutiny is also needed in this area. The online housingsearch process for communities and individuals of color is another
potential cause of perpetuating segregation. 110
As University of Chicago Law Professor Lee Anne Fennell
explains in her 2017 article, Searching for Housing, some online
home-seeker biases may come from user-generated preferences,
causing what is popularly known as de facto segregation. 111 For
example, many online housing marketers allow users to establish their

106. See O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 202–03; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 83, at 44–
45.
107. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 5 (“There is nothing unbiased about
scoring systems.”).
108. Fennell, supra note 47, at 361.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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own search characteristics and, therefore, biases can be attributed to
the preferences of the searchers rather than the algorithms.112
However, as Fennell suggests, some biases may be built into thirdparty algorithms in assumptions coded directly into search engine or
home marketing website algorithms. 113 This hypothesis regarding
biased search results is increasingly troubling as more people utilize
the internet to search for housing. 114 As more and more home
seekers turn to online portals to find where to live, it is important to
understand that internet marketers and search engine operators use
algorithms to provide users with a more personalized experience 115 by
cataloging user search histories, conducting geographical filtering, and
using “bots” that “scrape” webpages to compile user information. 116
By incorporating an internet user’s “scraped” information and
utilizing other aggregated data, algorithms can generate personalized
advertising based on a user’s “latent trait inferences.” 117 Latent trait
inferences are assumptions about users that algorithms generate by
analyzing their digital footprint. 118 Online advertising platforms use
latent trait inferences to target consumers and promote products they
believe will lead to consumption. 119 In theory, the attempt by online
marketers and search engine providers to create more personalized
ads based on latent trait inferences is merely an extension of

112. See id.
113. See id. at 362.
114. JESSICA LAUTZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, REAL ESTATE IN A
DIGITAL
AGE:
REPORT
2017
2
(2017),
https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/reports/2017/2017-real-estate-in-a-digitalage-03-10-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV2M-U5UV] (“In 1981, 22 percent of home
buyers read newspaper ads to find a home and eight percent used friends as an
information source. In 2016, 44 percent looked for properties online first.”); THE
DIGITAL HOUSE HUNT: CONSUMER AND MARKET TRENDS IN REAL ESTATE, NAT’L
ASSOC.
OF
REALTORS
&
GOOGLE
2–3
(2013),
https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/Study-Digital-House-Hunt2013-01_1.pdf. [https://perma.cc/F69P-ZSTA].
115. See PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 20.
116. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1204
(2018); Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/how-your-dataare-being-deeply-mined/ [https://perma.cc/WK7Z-N82R]; Paris Martineau, How the
Bathing Suit You Looked at Online Once Follows You Around for Two Months,
OUTLINE (Apr. 20, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/4224/how-that-ad-follows-youall-around-the-internet [https://perma.cc/HK4F-H7T4].
117. See O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 70; Balkin, supra note 116, at 1204; Tim Wu,
Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 20 (2017).
118. See PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 39.
119. Wu, supra note 117, at 13–14.
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traditional marketing practices, which attempted to do the same with
larger demographics. 120 But in practice, as the algorithms that inform
the process of personalization become more sophisticated, advertisers
are able to target consumers more and more precisely, leading to
predatory and discriminatory marketing practices. 121
When internet marketers and search engine providers deploy
algorithms that capture and analyze user data, and then generate
decisions based on that data, they serve as functional “gatekeepers”
and “editors.” As gatekeepers, advertising and search engine
algorithms determine what information is displayed to any particular
consumer. 122 As editors, they determine how information already
displayed is prioritized. 123 In the housing arena, online marketing and
search platforms potentially create algorithmic redlining if they are
serving as biased gatekeepers or editors. For example, as discussed
120. Ken Auletta, How the Math Men Overthrew the Mad Men, NEW YORKER
(May 21, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-communications/howPlanet
the-math-men-overthrew-the-mad-men
[https://perma.cc/FLD9-PFNP];
Money, Episode 678: This Ad’s for You, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 29, 2015),
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=410589806
[https://perma.cc/JYY5-D996].
121. See generally MAJORITY STAFF, OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER
INDUSTRY: COLLECTION AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES
12,
24–25
(2013),
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=bd5dad8b-a9e84fe9-a2a7-b17f4798ee5a
[https://perma.cc/UXP8-QULC];
Edith
Ramirez,
Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at FTC Fall Technology Series:
at
3,
4
(Sept.
7,
2016),
Ransomware,
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/983593/ramirez__ransomware_remarks_9-7-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H97-FR34] (referencing FED.
TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/databrokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9PY-7BSN]) (noting that this
narrowed focus gives internet platforms the ability to target a consumer based on
personably identifiable data that is usually gathered by a shadowy “data broker” and
then sold to the advertising platform); O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 78–80 (discussing
modern marketing algorithms); Zeynep Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms Beyond
Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of Computational Agency, 13 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 203, 209 (2015); Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly
with a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES: BUS. DAY (May 20, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/20tele.html?pagewanted=all
[https://nyti.ms/2m4hOgU]; Michael Kosinski, Opinion, Congress May Have Fallen
for Facebook’s Trap, but You Don’t Have to, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/opinion/facebook-data-privacy-advertising.html
[https://nyti.ms/2zV3ih0] (discussing Facebook’s methods of utilizing user data for
targeted advertising).
122. See Tufekci, supra note 121, at 206, 208.
123. See id. at 206; Wu, supra note 117, at 20.
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further below, by using “big data” and making accurate latent trait
inferences about users, platforms can accurately identify users
through race-correlative data points like zip code, name, profile
picture, or various other data points in a user’s digital footprint.124
When internet home marketing and search engines use these
segregating scoring systems to stereotype and make assumptions
about consumers, they nudge seekers of color towards houses
available in communities and neighborhoods predominantly
comprised of minorities, while simultaneously nudging white home
seekers toward options in predominantly white and wealthy
communities, thereby perpetuating preexisting segregation. 125
To be sure, this is only one of many potential harms in online home
marketing that could result from automated decision-making, and
should be studied further. 126 Currently, there is little data on how
websites like Trulia, Craigslist, or Facebook prioritize their millions of
listings, because these massive databases have utilized intellectual
property laws to incorporate a veil of secrecy in an effort to protect
their code. 127 In 2018, however, a lawsuit was filed against socialmedia juggernaut Facebook, alleging that the abovementioned
discriminatory marketing practices occurred on its website. 128 Fairhousing advocates brought the challenge, stating that Facebook had
been “encourage[ing] its paid advertisers to discriminate using its vast
trove of personal data.” 129 Though alarming, the litigation filed
124. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 90; Balkin, supra note
116, at 1164.
125. See Fennell, supra note 47, 361–63.
126. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC
SYSTEMS,
OPPORTUNITY,
AND
CIVIL
RIGHTS
5
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_d
ata_discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ9Q-JZ2Z] (detailing several areas of
potential harm but focusing mainly on criminal justice, employment, higher
education, marketing and lending, particularly access to credit, and mentioning
housing only in brief); Fennell, supra note 47, at 361.
127. Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics
for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 282, 284.
128. Complaint, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. et al. v. Facebook Inc., No. 18 Civ. 2689
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018).
129. Samantha Schmidt, Facebook Sued for Allegedly Allowing Housing
CHI.
TRIB.
(Mar.
28,
2018),
Advertisers
to
Discriminate,
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-facebook-sued-housingdiscrimination-20180328-story.html [https://perma.cc/HZJ5-NN3C]. This lawsuit was
settled on March 19, 2019. See Opinion, Facebook Faces a Reckoning for Redlining,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/opinion/facebookdiscrimination-civil-rights.html [https://nyti.ms/2CJmFL2]; Facebook Settlement,
NAT’L FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, https://nationalfairhousing.org/facebooksettlement/ [https://perma.cc/JZ8P-TM3M].
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against Facebook’s alleged marketing practices should come as no
surprise. While research on how algorithms impact the marketing of
housing is scant, there is abundant data showing that other areas of
online advertising –– while not specifically incorporating race –– have
incorporated race-compatible data points that produce race-oriented
The use of race-compatible data points in online
results. 130
algorithms has drawn the ire of scholars and policymakers alike, who
have reported that algorithms can come to biased conclusions that
assume a person’s race based on factors like name, geographical
region, record of consumer purchases, public records, and myriad
other sources. 131 These scholars and policymakers argue that by
allowing advertisers to use race-compatible data points, we also allow
them to harmfully stereotype consumers. 132
One stark example of this is found in a 2012 study commissioned
by the Obama administration, which was tasked with assessing the
impact and use of big data in targeted online advertisements. 133 The
study showed that search-engine inquiries for typically AfricanAmerican names lead to “negative” advertisements, such as those
that contained the word “arrest.” 134 Accordingly, a hypothetical
person named Jerome who lives in a high-crime neighborhood, buys a
pack of cigarettes a week, and has had a prior eviction, may be
directed to options that would be considered “negative.” 135 By
contrast, typically Caucasian-American names lead to “neutral”
Anecdotes from other recent experiments
advertisements. 136
concerning automated decisions indicate similarly biased results. 137
One study showed that artificial intelligence algorithms
overwhelmingly responded to queries with the term, “beauty,” by
producing results that leaned toward favoring white (or at least
lighter) skin tones. 138
130. BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 42, at 8; PASQUALE, supra
note 35, at 20.
131. PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 39.
132. Id.
133. BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 42, at 3.
134. Id. at 7.
135. PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 39.
136. See id.; BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 42, at 7.
137. See generally NOBLE, supra note 3, at 25 (discussing the trend of autopredictions in search engines queries that begin with “why are black girls . . . ” ending
with predictions such as “ . . . always angry,” and similar results).
138. Sam Levin, A Beauty Contest Was Judged by AI and the Robots Didn’t Like
Dark
Skin,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
8,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/08/artificial-intelligence-beautycontest-doesnt-like-black-people [https://perma.cc/C825-WJQP]; Natasha Lomas,
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Consequently, it seems that winning the uphill battle of fair and
sufficient housing finance may be, to this day, a Sisyphean chore, as
people of color may still be subjected to internet search and
marketing algorithms that discriminatorily segregate communities
based on race. By acting as biased gatekeepers and editors, and by
considering biased and discriminatory data points in their algorithms,
online lending and housing search platforms are potentially
prioritizing user-specific advertising at the expense of equitable
marketing. Such algorithmic redlining is harmful to the welfare of
consumers from minority communities and only serves to reinforce
cascading segregation. 139
B.

When You Can’t Buy, Rent: Affordable Housing and Rental
Housing Selection Algorithms

Unfortunately, as a result of the many impediments discussed
above, low-income, predominantly minority individuals living in
communities of color, are often unable to purchase housing. 140 Once
purchasing is not a viable option, seekers-of-color are left to fend for
themselves in competitive and pricey rental housing markets.141
FaceApp Apologizes for Building Racist AI, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 25, 2017),

https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/25/faceapp-apologises-for-building-a-racist-ai/
[https://perma.cc/DU38-XSNV]; Fiona Rutherford & Alan White, This Is Why Some
People Think Google’s Results Are “Racist,” BUZZFEED (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/fionarutherford/heres-why-some-people-think-googlesresults-are-racist [https://perma.cc/DU38-XSNV] (discussing how Google’s search
engine brings up mainly white people when users search for “beauty,” though Google
has denied this is any intentional bias on their part, claiming that this is just the way
society thinks); see also DENISE MURRELL, POSING MODERNITY: THE BLACK MODEL
FROM MANET AND MATISSE TO TODAY 116–18 (2018) (discussing how artists during
the Harlem Renaissance sought to change the stigma of African Americans,
particularly those from inner cities such as Harlem); Margaret Talbot, The Myth of
Whiteness in Classical Structure, NEW YORKER (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/the-myth-of-whiteness-in-classicalsculpture [https://perma.cc/T7HM-4NAS] (discussing how, through our false
awareness of color in ancient art, we associate positive things with whiteness and
negative things with color, and that we have “a tendency to equate whiteness with
beauty, taste, and classical ideals, and to see color as alien, sensual, and garish”).
139. PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 56; Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator,
66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1269 (2017)
(discussing how digital intermediaries influence the behavior of public actors and
cause suboptimal decisions).
140. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 30.
141. Justin Fox, New York’s Have and Have-Not Housing Market, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-22/new-york-shousing-market-favors-wealthier-renters [https://perma.cc/8399-DW4B]; La Ganga,
supra note 53; David Schaper, Houston’s Tight Rental Market Makes It Tough for
Low-Income Hurricane Victims, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 18, 2017),
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While rental and subsidized markets do not provide the same equity
value and cost-benefits of homeownership, these options are still
important to overall quality of life. 142 Fortunately, affordable housing
development has been on the rise, and creative policies to expand
affordable housing have recently been advanced. 143 But even if a
seeker-of-color resigns herself to renting rather than purchasing, a
hurdle remains: algorithms that determine rental tenancy can fall prey
to the same biases as algorithms in the housing purchase realm,
thereby exacerbating and furthering the harms of algorithmic
redlining.
Affordable housing plays a pivotal role in the public’s overall wellbeing, 144 but, because of the its low cost, access to affordable housing
is extremely competitive. 145 Undoubtedly, algorithms are a powerful
tool to assign affordable rental housing as efficiently as possible.146
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/18/551726491/houstons-tight-rental-market-makes-ittough-for-low-income-hurricane-victims [https://perma.cc/PF8P-CYQ7].
142. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 30.
143. Saraf Ahmed, 5 Cities Taking Steps to Improve Affordable Housing Access
FORBES
(June
21,
2017),
and
Availability,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bisnow/2017/06/21/5-cities-taking-steps-to-improveaffordable-housing-access-and-availability/#496429363f9f
[https://perma.cc/BEW3HJV5]; Henry Grabar, Minneapolis Confronts Its History of Housing Segregation,
SLATE (Dec. 7, 2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/12/minneapolis-single-familyzoning-housing-racism.html [https://perma.cc/6P6Z-2ENJ]; Jillian Weinberger,
Leaving Baltimore Behind, VOX (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.vox.com/theimpact/2018/11/30/18116513/baltimore-the-impact-income-inequality-race-housingsegregation [https://perma.cc/D37X-HWS8].
144. See, e.g., National Affordable Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12702 (2012) (stating
that the objective of the National Affordable Housing Act is to introduce policies
that “reaffirm the long-established national commitment to decent, safe, and sanitary
housing for every American”).
145. See, e.g., Tanya Warerkar, Essex Crossing’s First Affordable Housing Lottery
Nets
Over
93,000
Applicants,
CURBED
(June
8,
2017),
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/6/8/15761716/essex-crossing-affordable-housingapplications [https://perma.cc/R5XH-3U57] (demonstrating the disproportionality of
the solution to the problem: over 93,000 applicants for only 104 available affordable
units).
146. Caitlin Dewey, Creepy Startup Will Help Landlords, Employers and Online
Dates Strip-Mine Intimate Data from Your Facebook Page, WASH. POST (June 9,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/09/creepystartup-will-help-landlords-employers-and-online-dates-strip-mine-intimate-datafrom-your-facebook-page/?noredirect=on
[https://perma.cc/R5L6-7C3J];
Dia
Kayyali, Big Data and Hidden Cameras Are Emerging as Dangerous Weapons in the
Gentrification Wars, QUARTZ (Aug. 23, 2016), https://qz.com/763900/surveillanceand-gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/7LQZ-J8PQ] (discussing big data and tenant
screening firms); David Silverberg, Landlords Are Using a New Digital Tool to Dig
Up Dirt on Potential Tenants, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/yp35ev/landlords-naborly-tenantstoronto-vancouver-rentals [https://perma.cc/Z6J4-CLH6].
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As beneficial as some these algorithms may be, 147 some have
nonetheless been the subject of scrutiny from both legal observers
and housing advocates. 148 As examined below, fair housing advocates
and watchdog groups have asserted that the algorithms used in
affordable housing lotteries rely on improper, biased preferences.149
Further, algorithms are playing an increasingly important role in
deciding who qualifies for private-market rental units, often tilting the
playing field against individuals from low-income, minority
neighborhoods. 150

1.

Improper Preferences in Affordable Housing Algorithms

Recognizing the importance of housing affordability, federal, state,
and local governments have enacted legislation encouraging and, at
times, requiring available affordable housing — that is, housing
provided below market rate and available on an income-driven
basis. 151 These heavier government requirements, coupled with rising
market demand for affordable housing, have prompted housing
authorities, as well as the landlords and developers they work with, to
assess how to most efficiently administer and disburse affordable
housing units to tenants. 152 As already mentioned, algorithms are a
powerful tool to enhance efficiency, and so have unsurprisingly
become heavily intertwined in the administration of affordable

147. HALIL TOROS & DANIEL FLAMING, PRIORITIZING WHICH HOMELESS PEOPLE
GET HOUSING USING PREDICTIVE ALGORITHMS, ECONOMIC ROUNDTABLE 1 (2017),
https://economicrt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Prioritizing-Which-HomelessPeople-Get-Housing-Using-Predictive-Algorithms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SEJ8NQKC].
148. Fennell, supra note 47, at 362.
149. Schmidt, supra note 129.
150. Dunn & Ehman, supra note 18, at 36–38.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 12702 (2012); see also A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING, NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION 8–9
(2015),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Sec1.03_Historical-Overview_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3MQ-FGZE]; David Roberts, The Future of Housing Policy Is
Being Decided in California, VOX (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/cities-andurbanism/2018/2/23/17011154/sb827-california-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/3E3E4FYB] (describing a series of reforms passed by the California legislature and signed
into law by then governor Jerry Brown); Mandatory Housing Inclusion, How It
N.Y.C.
DEP’T
OF
HOUSING
(2018),
Works,
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/housing/downloads/pdf/mih-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4D2-DR2M].
152. David Thacher, The Rise of Criminal Background Screening in Rental
Housing, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 11–18 (2008); Dunn & Ehman, supra note 18, at 36–
38.
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housing. 153 While enhancing the efficient production and distribution
of affordable housing, many of these algorithms have also been
labelled discriminatory.
In New York City, for example, Mayor Bill de Blasio’s
administration introduced — and the city council passed — policies
requiring that approximately twenty percent of all new housing
To be
development be reserved as “affordable housing.” 154
recognized as “affordable,” units must satisfy two conditions: first,
they have to be rented at a rate below market value, typically thirty
percent less than other comparable units in the same building; second,
they must be available only to applicants that earn a certain
percentage below the building’s area median income. 155 With this
approach in place, individuals and families are able to apply to an
“affordable housing lottery” that randomly selects applicants pending
a screening process to assess whether they qualify for one of the
affordable housing units. 156 Though designating a block of units for
low-income individuals and families may help integrate
neighborhoods, these efforts are often insufficient, particularly when
the algorithms used to generate such decisions remain faulty. 157
For instance, while New York’s approach is lauded as progressive,
the algorithm used to select lottery applicants for screening also
allegedly has a built-in bias: a preference for members of the
Advocates and lawmakers have
surrounding community. 158
challenged this preferential treatment and argue that it gives an unfair
advantage to individuals that already live in the area. 159 These critics

153. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
154. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUSING, supra note 151.
155. See Affordability and Area Median Income (AMI), N.Y.C. DEP’T OF
HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEV. (2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/areamedian-income.page [https://perma.cc/L46U-9WNS]; Income Eligibility, N.Y.C.
HOUSING DEV. CORP. (2018), http://www.nychdc.com/pages/Income-Eligibility.html
[https://perma.cc/QKQ8-XRNS].
156. See Mariela Quintana, How the NYC Affordable Housing Lottery Works,
STREETEASY.COM (Apr. 17, 2018), https://streeteasy.com/blog/nyc-affordablehousing-lottery/ [https://perma.cc/GW34-86Y8].
157. See Kathryn Brenzel, New York City Is Still Segregated 50 Years After Fair
THEREALDEAL
(Apr.
23,
2018),
Housing
Act,
https://therealdeal.com/2018/04/23/city-is-still-segregated-50-years-after-fair-housingact/ [https://perma.cc/B3MD-ZXEZ]; Warerkar, supra note 145.
158. See Quintana, supra note 156. It is worth mentioning that while selection
algorithms have drawn scorn from across the country, they are addressed only briefly
here.
159. See Sally Goldenberg, 50 Years After Fair Housing Act, New York City Still
Struggles with Residential Segregation, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/04/23/50-years-after-fair-
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often suggest that the preference policy keeps neighborhoods
demographically homogeneous. 160 Even though affordable housing
algorithms are the product of government policy, they face the same
challenges that corporate algorithms must contend with — they are
obtuse, overly relied upon, and built using questionable data. 161
The obtuseness of government affordable housing algorithms is
similar to the veil of secrecy surrounding the aforementioned internet
marketing websites. 162 Some municipalities disclose the details of
their affordable housing lottery preferences, but for most of the tens
of thousands of applicants jockeying for a few hundred units, the
lottery and selection process remain a mystery. 163 Moreover, city and
state governments are turning to algorithms to make choices
concerning affordable housing and, with increasing frequency,
algorithmic decisions are having the last word. 164 Of course,
algorithms can be shortcuts to efficiently administering remedial
decisions and approving a balanced pool of applicants, but reliance on
these automated decisions without the prudence of human intuition
may be costly and exacerbate segregation.
Even if the veil of secrecy was lifted and the details of algorithms
were known, applicants and fair housing advocates have raised
concerns that some factors introduced by municipalities or affordable
unit landlords are biased and antithetical to integration. 165 Consider
the 2010 dispute between the Department of Justice and the wealthy

housing-act-new-york-city-still-struggles-with-residential-segregation-376170
[https://perma.cc/7LDZ-K53K].
160. See Ethan Geringer-Sameth, ‘Community Preference’ Lawsuit at Center of
Affordable Housing, Segregation Debates, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 29, 2017),
http://www.gothamgazette.com/city/6838-community-preference-lawsuit-at-center-ofaffordable-housing-segregation-debates [https://perma.cc/4N4A-HGAE]; Mireya
Navarro, New York City Is Sued Over Lotteries Used for Subsidized Housing, N.Y.
TIMES (July 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/nyregion/new-york-city-issued-over-lotteries-used-for-subsidized-housing.html [https://nyti.ms/1NMMHtU].
161. See generally Dunn & Ehman, supra note 18, at 36–38.
162. See id.
163. See Lauren Cook, How NYC’s Affordable Housing Lottery Works:
NYCurious, AM N.Y. (June 20, 2018), https://www.amny.com/real-estate/nycaffordable-housing-lottery-explained-1.12691144 [https://perma.cc/8KSN-CT53].
164. See id.
165. See Jessica Lerner, Developer Heads to Court over Denial of Branford
Affordable Housing Project, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.nhregister.com/metro/article/Developer-heads-to-court-over-denial-ofBranford-12710499.php [https://perma.cc/26J7-HTKP]; Hiram Sasser, How Zoning
Can Be a Subtle Kind of Bigotry, N.Y. POST (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://nypost.com/2018/12/14/how-zoning-can-be-a-subtle-kind-of-bigotry/
[https://perma.cc/N4PQ-6E5X].
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Connecticut township of Darien, an idyllic town about midway
between New York City and New Haven, Connecticut, with highperforming public schools and an overall high quality of life. 166 In
2010, Darien’s population was 94 percent white, 167 and when a
developer purchased a plot of land with the goal of providing
affordable housing, Darien’s affordable housing algorithmic weighing
Darien’s municipal algorithm
system came under scrutiny. 168
distributed affordable housing based on a “priority population”
preference system, which provided that available affordable units
“shall be offered for sale or rent to income eligible households in
accordance with [a set of seven] priority designations.” 169 The first six
priority categories gave preference to Darien residents or former
Darien residents, with the lowest priority category explicitly
relegating “[a]ll other individuals or families” to an afterthought.170
Darien’s process would obviously work to the disadvantage of
housing applicants from nearby Norwalk or Bridgeport, Connecticut
towns with substantial minority populations and far less
opportunity. 171 Indeed, Darien’s suspect procedure was going to be
investigated by the Department of Justice, 172 and, fortunately, Darien
withdrew its policy after the Department of Justice intervened.173
Unfortunately, however, such preference systems still exist elsewhere,

166. See Renee Williams, Recent Developments in Challenges to Residency
Preferences, 43 HOUSING L. BULL. 129, 131 (2013).
167. See id.
168. See Lisa Prevost, Snob Zones: Fear, Money, and Real Estate, SALON (July 20,

2013), https://www.salon.com/2013/07/20/snob_zones_fear_money_and_real_estate/
[https://perma.cc/HQ5Q-SUSY].
169. TOWN OF DARIEN AFFORDABLE HOUSING PLAN 50–51 (approved August 24,
2009) (detailing seven priority designations, from highest to lowest, as follows: “(a)
Individuals or families who live and work in the Town of Darien who provide
volunteer emergency/life-saving services for residents of the Town. (b) Individuals or
families who are employed by the Town of Darien or Darien Public School system.
(c) Individuals or families who live and work in the Town of Darien. (d) Individuals
or families who live in the Town of Darien. (e) Individuals who work in the Town of
Darien. (f) Individuals or families who previously lived for a minimum of one (1)
year in the Town and wish to return. (g) All other individuals or families.”).
170. See id.
171. See Erin Boggs, Testimony of Open Communities Alliance in Support of HB

7297, An Act Establishing a Private Right of Action in the Duty to Promote Fair
Housing and Requiring a Study of Connecticut’s Housing Inventory and Current and
Sess.
Year
2017
(Mar.
22,
2017),
Future
Housing
Needs,
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2017/PDdata/Tmy/2017HB-07297-R000322Boggs,%20Erin,%20Executive%20Director%20Open%20Communities%20Alliance%20-TMY.PDF [https://perma.cc/L26Y-GZ7J].
172. See Williams, supra note 166, at 131.
173. See Prevost, supra note 168.
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in urban areas such as New York City and in affluent suburbs like
Cheshire, Connecticut. 174

2.

Rental Housing Algorithms

Issues similar to those of publicly administered affordable housing
algorithms have been raised about tenancy selection application
algorithms utilized by the private rental sector. 175 Under the FHA,
landlords with rental units on the private market must adhere to a
federal standard of nondiscrimination — they cannot refuse to rent a
unit for reasons that rely on protected-class characteristics such as
Though the algorithms that evaluate modern rental
race. 176
applications do not explicitly incorporate race, they often take
account of a massive amount of statistics (through big data) that
closely correlate with race, such as credit score, eviction records,
arrest records, levels of education, employment backgrounds, and
previous addresses. 177 In another example of the “scored society,”
because rental markets are so closely competitive, landlords often
employ “tenant-screening firms” to “score” rental applicants and
determine the applicant’s likely performance as a tenant.178

174. See CHESHIRE COUNTY ZONING REGULATIONS § 44.5 (as amended 2016),
http://www.cheshirect.org/media/93458/amended-zoning-regs-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7SAN-UQQN]; J. David Goodman, From Former De Blasio
Official, an Admission on Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/nyregion/nyc-segregation-affordablehousing.html [https://nyti.ms/2FClgoh].
175. See generally Dunn & Ehman, supra note 18, at 36–38; see also Jonathan
Mahler & Steve Eder, ‘No Vacancies’ for Blacks: How Donald Trump Got His Start,
and Was First Accused of Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/us/politics/donald-trump-housing-race.html
[https://nyti.ms/2bOYUVI] (noting that in its most straightforward and pernicious
form, one method of “algorithmic redlining” is simply never reviewing applications
from people of color).
176. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (“It is the policy of the United States to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”); see
also Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(“[The FHA] is intended to promote ‘open, integrated residential housing patterns
and to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of
opportunities the Act was designed to combat.’”) (citing Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous.
Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973)).
177. See Thacher, supra note 152, at 11, 12; Dunn & Ehman, supra note 18, at 35,
36; Devon Thorsby, Are Online Applications Making Renting an Apartment Easier
or Harder?, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016), https://realestate.usnews.com/realestate/articles/are-online-applications-making-renting-an-apartment-easier-or-harder
[https://perma.cc/6Z45-U4YV].
178. See Dunn & Ehman, supra note 18, at 35–36.
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Unfortunately, like the scoring systems in housing finance, these
scores are sometimes generated using biased or bad data. 179
As was the case with increasing transparency in housing finance to
provide more equitable lending opportunities for borrowers-of-color,
increasing transparency in renting will make a significant impact.
Transparency in decisions regarding who has access to rental housing,
who sees marketed units for rent, and who gets selected for those
units is crucial to a fair rental housing process that promotes
community integration. It is evident that without appropriate reform
people of color will continue to bear much of the brunt of biased data
and discriminatory algorithms. So what are some of the solutions to
correct bad data and corrupt automated decisions? This next Part
explores prior reforms to the era of pencil redlining and potential
reforms needed to bring those policies into the modern age.
III. POLICIES AND SOLUTIONS: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING
AHEAD
During the previous era of pencil redlining, many progressive
policies such as the FHA, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA),
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) were passed in reaction
to the improprieties and inequalities in access to fair and adequate
housing.
The FHA introduced prohibitions against housing
discrimination on the basis of enumerated protected categories,
including race, color, and national origin, and established strict
guidelines for the fair marketing of affordable housing to a range of
potential applicants. 180 The CRA was enacted in direct response to
pencil redlining, establishing lending test policies that required banks
to adhere to disclosure requirements, which federal regulators could
then use to determine whether banks were fulfilling the needs of lowincome areas and individuals. 181 Similarly, the FCRA was introduced

179. In fact, TransUnion, a company that produces credit scores, has branched out
and begun to offer “tenant scoring” through a subsidiary company, SmartMove. See
Andrea Collatz, SmartMove’s ResidentScore vs. A Typical Credit Score: Which Is
TRANSUNION:
BLOG
(June
14,
2016),
Better?,
https://www.mysmartmove.com/SmartMove/blog/residentscore-tailored-tenantscreening.page [https://perma.cc/F2AZ-2EEZ]; see also Dunn & Ehman, supra note
18, at 38–39.
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).
181. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22, 195.22, 228.22, and 345.22 (detailing the lending tests
initiated by the CRA and enforced through four federal banking agencies: the
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, respectively); see also ROBERTO QUERCIA & JANNEKE RATCLIFFE, THE
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to ensure banks and credit reporting bureaus were not using incorrect
or biased information in creditworthiness evaluations. 182
Though well-intended, because of misapplication and modern
technological advancements, these policies are no longer able to
protect the public from the current era of algorithmic redlining.
Take, for example, the CRA’s lending test requirements, which allow
the government to monitor how banks are lending to individuals
specifically in low-income areas where the banks operate a brick-andmortar branch. 183 This may have been effective as a direct response
to pencil redlining. 184 But today, as more banks move lending
practices online and close brick-and-mortar branches, and as more
and more modern financial technology institutions operate strictly
online, it is far harder to monitor whether banks are providing
investment and loan opportunities to the communities they are
encouraged to serve. 185 Similarly, as suggested by the plaintiffs in the
litigation against Facebook, modern algorithms, though not
specifically incorporating race, may be using race-correlative data to
skirt the FHA’s provisions that prohibit landlords from

COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: OUTSTANDING, AND NEEDS TO IMPROVE, THE
UNC
CENTER
FOR
COMMUNITY
CAPITAL
47–49
(2010),
https://www.frbsf.org/communitydevelopment/files/cra_outstanding_needs_improve1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XC9JLQE].
182. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); see also CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT
REPORTING
ACT,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-creditreporting-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGB4-695C].
183. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012) (stating, “[i]t is the purpose of this chapter to require
each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its authority when
examining financial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe
and sound operation of such institutions.”); John Taylor & Josh Silver, The
Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the Future, 53
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 203, 204–05 (2008); Ruth Simon & Coulter Jones, Goodbye,
George Bailey: Decline of Rural Lending Crimps Small-Town Business, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goodbye-george-bailey-decline-of-rurallending-crimps-small-town-business-1514219515 [https://perma.cc/D7VP-AVFD].
184. See Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85
GEO. L.J. 237, 241 (1996).
185. See Quercia & Ratcliffe, supra note 181, at 53–54; Thomas W. Beetham, The
Community Reinvestment Act and Internet Banks: Redefining the Community, 39
B.C. L. REV. 911, 912–13 (1998); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA
Implications of Predatory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1596–97 (2002);
Krista Shonk, Brainard: Fed Fully Engaged in CRA Reform Process, AM. B. ASS’N.
BANKING J. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/10/brainard-fedfully-engaged-in-cra-reform-process/ [https://perma.cc/HPM8-LZBP].
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discriminatory marketing and from rejecting housing applicants based
on their belonging to a suspect class. 186
With an eye toward modernization, the final Part of this Article
suggests reforms to these policies and others — upgrades to the web
of intersecting guidelines that impact fair housing so they seamlessly
interact with policies that promote transparency and auditing. Some
of these upgrades demand human oversight over automated decisions
— because without this oversight, current automated decision systems
will continue their patterns of algorithmic redlining. Some of the
reforms proposed here are presently considered more out-of-the-box,
but, as argued herein, are critical to promote community integration
and desegregation in a modern society.
Broadly speaking, many scholars who have studied how to prevent
algorithms from furthering discrimination and producing disparate
impacts have called for more accountability in algorithms that
generate automated decisions, specifically by increasing transparency,
auditing or oversight, and involving human autonomy. 187 Without
transparency, those impacted by algorithmic redlining in housing
finance, home marketing, and tenancy selection will remain unaware
of how enigmatic algorithms and big data reduce their opportunities
for fair and affordable housing or how they worsen community
segregation. 188 Without auditing, biased data inputs and disparate
outcomes may continue to perpetuate race-based results, like nudging
minority home seekers towards housing in minority areas while
pushing non-minority home seekers to more affluent areas.189
Finally, without human oversight and autonomous decision-making in
fair and affordable housing, gatekeepers such as management
companies and lenders may continue to rely on algorithms that are

186. Complaint, Assistant Secretary for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity v.
Facebook,
Inc.
(Aug.
13,
2018),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/HUD_01-18-0323_Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UVD6-VACR] [hereinafter Housing Discrimination Complaint];
Brakkton Booker, HUD Hits Facebook for Allowing Housing Discrimination, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/19/640002304/hud-hitsfacebook-for-allowing-housing-discrimination [https://perma.cc/T3KH-UGVB].
187. See Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 189, 190 (2017) (arguing that trade secrets can be adequately protected
even if we police algorithms by analyzing their results or their inputs); see also
BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 155–66 (2017).
188. See Housing Discrimination Complaint, supra note 186; Fennell, supra note
47, at 351; Goodman, supra note 97, at 501.
189. See Fennell, supra note 47, at 355–56, 361–62.

256

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

perilous to minorities and advantageous for non-minorities. 190 In the
following section, each of these arguments — transparency, auditing,
and autonomy — is analyzed to assess how future policies ought to
combat this new era of algorithmic redlining.
A. Transparency: Promoting Choice and Accountability Through an
Understanding of Automated Decisions
Automated decisions that impact housing procurement should
become more transparent. In reaction to the previous era of pencil
redlining, many fair housing advocates combatted segregation
through legislative advocacy, pushing for laws such as the ECOA and
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) — both of which
required banks to disclose certain scoring and rating techniques they
use in credit evaluations. 191 Also, as previously mentioned, the CRA
was passed in response to redlining and required banks to report their
efforts of lending in low- and moderate-income communities to
federal regulators. 192 To make these laws relevant to modern
technologies, they must be updated to incorporate similar disclosure
and lending requirements for new types of internet financial outlets
and online lending institutions. Further, the laws must be amended to
establish greater disclosure requirements for banks and online
marketers that rely on automated decision systems.
Consider the CRA, which presently does not apply to increasingly
popular internet banking institutions and popular financial
technology outlets. CRA Section 2901 requires federally insured
banks to demonstrate that they “serve the convenience and needs of
the communities in which they are chartered to do business,” and
demands that they evidence a “continuing and affirmative obligation
to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they
are chartered,” consistent with their safe and sound operation.193
Also relevant is Section 2903 of the CRA, which provides that the
bank’s designated regulatory agency shall “assess the [community
banking] institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire
community,
including
lowand
moderate-income

190. See id. at 351.
191. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 1002.6 (2012);
Kleinman & Berger, supra note 9, at 958.
192. See Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), Pub. L. No. 95–128, 91 Stat. 1147 (2012) (requiring
minimum amount of investment for FDIC-backed banks that have a physical
presence in a community).
193. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2012).
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neighborhoods . . . .” 194 Undoubtedly, these provisions were a step in
the right direction towards combatting the ills of the pencil redlining
era. However, the CRA should be updated so that it applies beyond
banks and the “local communities in which they are chartered.”
Rather, amendments to the act should focus on applying to all (or at
least to a large share) of online lending institutions, and should not be
tied to brick-and-mortar branches. Consider, also, the provisions of
the ECOA that require mortgage lenders to collect information for
“monitoring” when accepting mortgage applications for home
financing. 195 It should be evident that ethnicity ought not be a
requirement (or, at the very least, should be a permissive category),
but the Act should also be amended to include a provision that
requires lenders to disclose the exact metrics or data points they use
to generate scores or determine borrower interest rates.
Aside from revising antiquated language in laws to make them
current, transparency can be facilitated by requiring disclosure from
public agencies that utilize privately-owned algorithmic decisionmaking systems. When contracting and partnering with businesses,
federal, state, and local governments should be required to disclose
the background information, such as the various data sources, of the
algorithms they use. For example, legal advocates from the Brennan
Center at New York University School of Law recently sued the New
York Police Department (NYPD) after it refused to comply with the
Center’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request, asking for and
receiving some NYPD documents about its predictive policing
algorithms. 196 Rather than requiring lawsuits and FOIL requests to
invoke transparency, governments at all levels should use their
contracting power to require disclosure, making transparency the rule
rather than the exception. A bill introduced by the New York City
Council is a model for legislation that is a step in this direction. The
bill, though not requiring public disclosure, would create a
governmental “task force” to review algorithms being used by public
entities and actors. 197

194. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (2012).
195. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012).
196. See Decision & Judgment at 1–5, Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. Law
Sch. v. NYC Police Dept., No. 160541/2016, 2017 WL 6610414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 27,
2017).
197. See Julia Powles, New York City’s Bold, Flawed Attempt to Make
Algorithms
Accountable,
NEW
YORKER
(Dec.
20,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/new-york-citys-bold-flawedattempt-to-make-algorithms-accountable [https://perma.cc/V29Q-RXYB] (describing
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Aside from the above proposed legislative amendments and
contractual changes, lawmakers should require advanced disclosure
from the credit bureaus that generate credit scores or from the
lenders that make decisions using these algorithms — this is a change
that would directly address the aforementioned hurdles in the housing
arena. Further, governments should require disclosure from the
online marketers that act as gatekeepers and editors in disseminating
home marketing information, otherwise seekers would not be able to
determine whether they are viewing truly unbiased results. Finally,
when algorithms operate to screen affordable and rental tenancy
applicants, those administering the algorithms should clearly and
expressly inform lottery entrants and rental applicants about the
process by, for example, disclosing what factors are weighed and
naming any third-party screening consultancies that are involved.
Lawmakers have a responsibility to ensure that seekers,
particularly those from minority neighborhoods, have the ability to
assess whether scores are biased, search characteristics are skewed, or
factors are perpetuating segregation by limiting access for people of
color to move into non-minority neighborhoods. A powerful way to
do this is by increasing public transparency, empowering seekers and
renters by giving them more knowledge of the details of otherwise
opaque algorithms that make potentially life-changing decisions for
them. However, disclosure alone is not enough; to ensure a level
playing field, lawmakers must also audit the information algorithms
are being fed and the outcomes they generate.
B.

Auditing Algorithms for Fairness

In addition to disclosure, legislation should focus on auditing
algorithmic inputs and outputs. Inputs are the troves of data that
artificial intelligence algorithms learn from to arrive at outputs, the
actual autonomous decisions and scores that algorithms generate. 198
Algorithmic auditing is increasingly important as algorithms become
more complex and autonomous. 199 Transparency will go a long way
in requiring disclosure for identifiable source code information in an
algorithm, like what preferences are already built into an affordable

legislation introduced in New York City that creates a task force to analyze and
report on the use of algorithms used by City agencies).
198. See Kim, supra note 187, at 190; Madden et al., supra note 43, at 66; Kuang,
supra note 39.
199. See James Guszcza et al., Why We Need to Audit Algorithms, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/11/why-we-need-to-audit-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/3XXQ-RN8Y].
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housing lottery’s policy. However, as recently explained in an article
by a group of leading internet scholars, transparency alone is
necessary but not sufficient:
Machine learning, one increasingly popular approach to automated
decisionmaking, is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis [i.e.,
through transparency] because it involves situations where the
decisional rule itself emerges automatically from the specific data
under analysis, sometimes in ways that no human can explain. In
this case, source code alone teaches a reviewer very little, since the
code only exposes the machine learning method used and not the
data-driven decision rule. 200

In other words, the code in machine learning algorithms is not
necessarily where biases generate, rather, they come from the data
with which the algorithm is “taught.” Accordingly, regulators
advocating for transparency would struggle to understand disclosures
made for complex machine learning algorithms, because they crunch
gargantuan amounts of data, learn from it, and then make
autonomous decisions. 201 For such algorithms, it is important to
monitor the types of data inputs they use, and then correct any biased
information they are being fed. 202 In that regard, where algorithms
operate to influence key public welfare decisions, such as those in
affordable housing, operators should be required to disclose what
data sets they used to “train” the artificial intelligence algorithm.
Simultaneously, the outputs produced by these algorithms should be
audited to assess whether there is a constant bias that repeats time
and again, and whether they produce results otherwise adverse to the
public interest. 203
As applied to the aforementioned areas of algorithmic redlining,
credit card companies, credit reporting bureaus, and mortgage
lenders should be required to disclose the data inputs they use to
formulate credit scores and mortgage rates. Simultaneously, those
entities ought to be audited to determine whether the scores and rates
they are producing are disproportionately higher for lenders-of-color,
or whether they produce other disparate impacts on marginalized
populations. Internet marketers, search engine operators, affordable

200. Kroll et al., supra note 26, at 638.
201. See id.
202. Kroll et al., supra note 26, at 639, 699–705; Roy D. Simon, Artificial
N.Y.
ST.
B.
ASSOC.
(Apr.
2018),
Intelligence,
Real
Ethics,
http://www.nysba.org/Journal/2018/Apr/Artificial_Intelligence,_Real_Ethics/
[https://perma.cc/D972-PU8Z].
203. Kroll et al., supra note 26, at 640 n.14; Simon, supra note 202.
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housing lottery administrators, and landlords that utilize algorithms
should be similarly audited to ensure they rely on non-discriminatory
data for their inputs, and that they correct any outputs that produce
adverse results for disenfranchised groups.
C.

Human Oversight and Autonomy: Algorithms as a Method of
Retaining Free Will

Increased transparency and oversight are especially necessary in
decisions regarding fundamental needs as crucial as housing. But
such a basic right also demands human autonomy, so that we can
ensure affordable units are fairly administered. 204 As expressed
previously, housing is an element of American life that closely binds
individuals to what society has frequently considered of utmost
importance: education, health, job opportunity, economic prosperity,
community development, and community integration. 205 Thus, while
both transparency and auditing are required to break down the
barriers that currently prohibit access to housing, neither will solve
the problems of algorithmic hubris, particularly because of
automation bias — the human tendency to believe without question
algorithmic results. 206 To tamper our overreliance of algorithms,
automated decision making must be coupled with an accountable
level of human autonomy. Take, for example, a 2016 exchange
between Tom Woods, the Chairman of the National Association of
Home Builders, and then U.S. Senator Heidi Heitkamp, which took
place at a Congressional hearing concerning access to mortgage
credit. 207 Senator Heitkamp asked Mr. Woods directly about the
“trend to try and analyze creditworthiness looking at big data and
algorithms and different kinds of inputs.” 208 Implying that such a

204. O’NEIL, supra note 3, at 155.
205. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
206. Citron, supra note 40, at 1271–72; see also Sandra Faucett, Tenant Screening:
Finding
a
Great
Renter,
ZILLOW,
https://www.zillow.com/rentalmanager/resources/multiple-qualified-rental-applications/
[https://perma.cc/3TRXVZAG] (advising agents against going with their “gut,” stating that landlords should
not go with their intuitive choice but should rely on tenant screening tool: “When
you’re faced with multiple qualified renter applications, it’s tempting to start looking
at their personal, nonfinancial qualities to help you select your resident. Don’t.”).
207. Exploring Regulatory Burdens that Are Restricting Mortgage Credit,

Including Recommendations to Alleviate the Burden: Hearing Before the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 114th

Cong.
38–40
(2016),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG114shrg95735/pdf/CHRG-114shrg95735.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DJ27-3DZP]
[hereinafter Hearing on Obtaining Mortgage Credit].
208. Id.
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trend may lead to the overreliance of algorithmically generated scores
and decisions, Senator Heitkamp wanted to know if this was a present
problem or “a 10-year-out problem.” 209 Mr. Woods responded
indicating that it was likely a “10-year-out problem,” but that he was
“intrigued” by that kind of data. 210 He also indicated that, at least in
the early stages of this “trend,” such scoring did limit the autonomy of
the community banker, steering them away from making an intuitive
decision:
You could have a banker, a client or customer comes in and you
look at the financial statement. It checks all the boxes. There is no
way you are going to give them a loan. The guy who owns the body
shop down the street who you know has always paid his bills,
because you know his community reputation, you want to give him
the loan and you do not want to be dinged for it in an examination,
or you want to be able to do what you have always done in your
communities. 211

Mr. Woods’s description of the “guy who owns a body shop”
epitomizes the risk of the community banker strictly adhering to
algorithmic scoring and decisions. A banker must be willing to
consider the validity a loan that his or her intuition tells them might
be valid, regardless of automaton. This is especially vital when
algorithms operate to perpetuate adverse lending practices by failing
to serve individuals and families that have been discriminately scored
and ruled uncreditworthy. Accordingly, regulations in the housing
arena should seek to implement a structure where decisions are
ultimately made or reviewed by a human decision-maker who can
think about justice, fairness, and equity. 212
Procedures should be put in place to allow community bankers and
other lenders to approve loans that depart from algorithmic decisions
if they feel that the algorithms failed to consider, or adversely
considered, “intangibles” that ought to point towards approval. The
same should be applied to housing authorities and landlords that use
algorithms for affordable housing lotteries and rental tenancy.
Moreover, as discussed in detail in the following section, internet
marketers and search engine operators should be held accountable
for knowingly using algorithms that operate as biased gatekeepers

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 1–18 (discussing how the rise of algorithms has
become so perfuse that it has substituted the judgement of the community banker).
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and editors, rather than being shielded from liability under the safe
harbors of internet advertising legislation.
D. Other Reforms and Modernizations
As is often the case with reforms, implementing procedures that
increase transparency, auditing, and human oversight will be an uphill
battle. For one, as noted by the exchange between Mr. Woods and
Senator Heitkamp, many key stakeholders see these issues as a “10year-out problem,” leading them to sweep the issue under the rug or
become more reactionary than proactive. 213 Moreover, as briefly
addressed above, disclosure requirements through transparency and
auditing are difficult to demand from private actors that act in
completely private spheres, as these entities are protected by
intellectual property laws and other safe harbors. 214 The opacity of
automated decision-making in the private sector will remain a burden
to the “scored society” as long as intellectual property law and bank
regulations maintain favorable safe harbors, which protect the
interests of powerful corporate entities at the expense of
consumers. 215 The following section identifies and expands upon
reforms that several legal scholars have recently advocated for in
areas like intellectual property, data protection, internet law, and
public administration, which reflect the ways consumers operate in
the modern economy.

1.

Improvements to Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and
Internet Law

In the area of intellectual property, trade secret laws protect many
algorithms from disclosure, allowing private actors to veil automated
decisions behind a wall of business interests. 216 Banks, credit outlets,
mortgage evaluators, online marketers, and tenant-screening firms
can use trade secret protections to guard their valuable code. 217 In

Hearing on Obtaining Mortgage Credit, supra note 207, at 39.
Pasquale, supra note 127, at 282.
PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 14.
Id. at 6–14.
See id.; Christian Sandvig et al., An Algorithm Audit, in DATA AND
DISCRIMINATION: COLLECTED ESSAYS, OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE & NEW
AMERICA
7
(Seeta
Peña
Gangadharan
et
al.
eds.,
2014),
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/403-data-and-discrimination/OTI-Data-anDiscrimination-FINAL-small.pdf [https://perma.cc/F484-KSXW]; Darren Stevenson,
Locating Discrimination in Data-Based Systems, in DATA AND DISCRIMINATION:
COLLECTED ESSAYS, OPEN TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE & NEW AMERICA 16,
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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the future, such business interests should be weighed against notions
of public welfare, and courts ought to come to more favorable
decisions for plaintiffs bringing appeals against algorithmic decisions.
Such reforms have been promoted by internet law scholars like
Professor Frank Pasquale, author of The Black Box Society as well as
a number of other articles concerning internet law reform. Professor
Pasquale, along with other legal scholars, has suggested that internet
juggernauts provide services so critical to the public that they ought to
be viewed by courts and the public as utility companies, which are
typically subject to transparency requirements and reviews of
decision-making procedures. 218
Additionally, as evidenced by legislation introduced abroad,
transparency of algorithmic decisions can be accomplished through
legislation meant to police automated decisions. 219 In that regard, the
United States should consider introducing legislation similar to the
European Union’s comprehensive General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR took effect in 2018, replacing the
European Data Protection Directive (EDPD) that, in essence,
regulated the processing of personal data and brokerage of such
data. 220 The E.U. enacted the GDPR to cope with the slew of issues
that arise from rapid technological advancements, including data
privacy, algorithmic decision-making, and antitrust problems. 221
While the GDPR focuses heavily on data privacy and protection, a
key provision of the regulation, Article 22, specifically addresses

https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/403-data-and-discrimination/OTI-Data-anDiscrimination-FINAL-small.pdf [https://perma.cc/F484-KSXW].
218. Pasquale, supra note 127, at 298; see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural
Regulation and the New Utilities, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 911, 914 (2018); K. Sabeel
Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of
the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1689–90 (2018).
219. Craig McAllister, Note, What About Small Businesses: The GDPR and Its
Consequences for Small, U.S.-Based Companies, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
187, 189 (2017); Margot Kaminski, The GDPR’s Version of Algorithmic
Accountability, 2018 JOTWELL, at 1–2 (2018); Julian Wagner & Alexander Benecke,
National Legislation Within the Framework of the GDPR, 2 EUR. DATA PROT. L.
REV. 353, 353 (2016); Minke D. Reijneveld, Quantified Self, Freedom, and the
GDPR, 14 SCRIPTED 285, 287–88 (2017); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to

the Algorithm: Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You
Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 21 (2017); Robert van den Hoven van
Genderen, Privacy and Data Protection in the Age of Pervasive Technologies in AI
and Robotics, 3 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 338, 346 (2017).
220. Reijneveld, supra note 219, at 287.
221. McCallister, supra note 219, at 193.
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decisions based solely on automated decisions systems. 222 Article 22,
titled “Automated individual decision-making, including profiling,”
explicitly limits the reliance of auto-generated decisions involving an
individual’s legal rights.223 Additionally, Article 22 allows individuals
a right to intervene and dispute algorithmically generated decisions
they feel adversely impact them. 224 To make sure that entities
making algorithmically generated decisions are held accountable, the
GDPR also introduced provisions implementing fines for noncompliance, adding teeth to the oversight mechanisms put in place. 225
The United States should follow in the European Union’s footsteps
by pursuing a policy similar to that enacted in Article 22. This policy
should not limit oversight to algorithmically generated decisions
pertaining to legal rights, but should also expand oversight to those
decisions that concern fundamental moral rights such as those that
impact housing. This type of oversight would place the ultimate
autonomy back into the hands of the community banker, which will
level the playing field in online marketing and promote rational,
empathetic, human decision-making regarding housing finance and
rental options, even if it goes against outcomes calculated by

222. Regulation 2016/679, of Apr. 27, 2016, on the Protection of Natural Persons
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art.
22,
2016
O.J.
(L
119)
46
(EU),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:TOC
[https://perma.cc/S5P7-6BZY]
[hereinafter GDPR]; Automated Decision Taking: In Brief —What Does the Data
Protection Act Say About Automated Decision Taking?, U.K. INFO. COMM’R’S OFF.
(2018)
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-thegeneral-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-toautomated-decision-making-including-profiling/
[https://perma.cc/S7YL-RG6D];
Emily Pehrsson, The Meaning of the GDPR Article 22 2 (Stanford – Vienna
Transatlantic Tech. Law Forum, European Union Law Working Papers, No. 31,
2018),
https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/pehrsson_eulawwp31.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4YG-QJVT].
223. GDPR, supra note 222, art. 22(1) (stating, a person “shall have the right not to
be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling,
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
him or her”).
224. Id. art. 22(3) (“[T]he data controller shall implement suitable measures to
safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the
right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her
point of view and to contest the decision.”).
225. Sam Pfeifle, WP29 Releases Guidelines on Administrative Fines Under the
GDPR, INT’L ASSOC. PRIVACY PROFS. (Oct. 23, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/a29wpreleases-guidelines-on-administrative-fines-under-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/6CLSHCYJ].
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algorithms. 226 Undoubtedly, humans are also biased and imperfect,
but without any responsibility from a human actor, overreliance on
machine algorithms will leave housing decision-makers asleep at the
wheel, with limited recourse for housing advocates and seekers.

2.

Adjustments to Internet Law

In addition to adopting provisions similar to Article 22 of the
GDPR, the United States should emulate the E.U.’s general
philosophy and begin to consider a more comprehensive overhaul of
its antiquated regulations. Currently, a web of legislation impacts
how modern algorithmic decisions are regulated, but many of the
component pieces of legislation have been rendered ineffective by
technological advancements, or may even be antithetical to one
another. 227
One example of how the laws are now antiquated and ineffective is
illustrated by a principle provision of the FHA — the prohibition
against marketing housing on the basis of an enumerated protected
category, like race, color, or national origin. 228 Although this
provision is still in place, it can be easily skirted by algorithms that
make accurate latent trait inferences after analyzing data that is racecorrelative but not per se inclusive of race, color, or national origin.229
This seems like a paradoxical approach: advertisements for housing
that discriminate based on a protected class, such as race, are not
legal, but advertisements for housing that use assumptions based on a
digital footprint that imply race (but exclude its direct incorporation)
seem entirely lawful.
That the laws governing algorithmic decision-making can
sometimes act in opposition to one another is a serious problem. For
example, when advertisements that rely on implied race are
generated by computer-automated decisions and not curated by
humans, many of the marketers dispersing the ads are shielded from
liability — precisely because of various safe harbor provisions in

226. Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and
When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2007) (providing a

framework that can be used to determine the wisdom of using a technology to
enforce law by explaining the several types of perfect enforcement and analyzing the
concerns raised by their use).
227. Christina Mulligan, Technology Intermediaries and Freedom of Press, 66
S.M.U. L. REV. 157, 169–70 (2013).
228. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
229. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
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other parts of piecemeal legislation. 230 Specifically, safe harbor
provisions in the Digital Millennium Copy Right Act (DMCA) and
the Communications Decency Act (CDA) shield internet service
providers, online marketers, and search engine platforms from
liability for any content algorithmically generated on their
platforms. 231 Thus, online marketers and search engine platforms like
Facebook and Google are not liable for advertisements and other
gatekeeper decisions generated by algorithms. 232
Some internet advocates and users argue that these kinds of
legislative shields are foundational to facilitating internet free
speech. 233 This may certainly be true, and this work does not discount
the importance of free speech protections — but considering the
current state of affairs and the increasingly monopolistic tendencies of
internet firms, it seems the pendulum may have swung too far.
Internet-based corporations are so massive, inherently powerful, and
enjoy such significant protections from liability that Professor
Pasquale has called them “functional sovereigns” but “absentee
owners.” 234 Pasquale uses the term “functional sovereign” as a way
of describing “the level of power a private firm reaches when it is no
longer one of many market participants, but instead the main
supervisor and organizer of actual market participants.” 235 At the
same time, these massive firms operate as “absentee owners,”
“neglect[ing] traditional functions [firms] had previously served, in
order to maximize revenue in accordance with its . . . demands.” 236

230. PASQUALE, supra note 35, at 25; Balkin, supra note 116, at 1178; Adam
Weintraub, “Landlords Needed, Tolerance Preferred”: A Clash of Fairness and
Freedom in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, 54 VILL. L. REV. 337, 338–39
(2009) (describing situations where discriminatory ads were posted but the
webhosting platform was not liable).
231. Digital Millennium Copy Right Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)–(d) (2012);
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); Mulligan, supra note
226, at 169–70.
232. Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search
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has granted to search engines via the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
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Consider an example of this kind of contradiction — the safe
harbor provisions in the DMCA and CDA mean that if an
advertisement reflecting discriminatory housing marketing was
displayed in a print publication such as the Wall Street Journal or the
New York Times, the Journal or the Times would be liable for the
dissemination of the ad. 237 By contrast, if Facebook’s algorithms
were to display the same discriminatory advertisement on its
platform, Facebook would be immune from any liability as long as the
advertisement was a product of its algorithmic marketing system. 238

3.

Modernizing Public Administration

Appreciating the necessity for transparency, auditing, and human
oversight, as well as the need for comprehensive reform, some
scholars have suggested that a central government agency with
expertise in the area could be created to oversee and apply these
principles. In 2008, for example, Professors Oren Bracha and Frank
Pasquale suggested the need for a “Federal Search Commission,”
which would supervise search engine manipulation and algorithmic
discrimination. 239 In 2016, Professors Paul Ohm and Blake Reid
introduced a similar centralized authority concept. 240 Certainly, this
kind of centralized agency is needed, but it can go beyond
supervision. This agency should not only make search engine
algorithms and methods more transparent and accountable, but also
expand its reach into other areas of the internet, such as policing big
data brokers and private actors that rely on automated decisions to
make choices crucial to the public interest. 241 This agency should also
237. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access,
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1192–93
(2008); Weintraub, supra note 230, at 364 (describing, situations where discriminatory

ads were posted but the webhosting platform was not liable).
238. Mulligan, supra note 227, at 169–70.
239. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 237, at 1208–09; see also Pasquale, supra note
127, at 298.
240. Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has
Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1700 (2016).
241. Pasquale, supra note 127, at 298 (“If search engines are to be accountable at
all, if their interest is to be balanced against those of the various other claimants
involved in search-related disputes, and if social values are to be given any weight,
some governmental agent should be able to peer into the black box of search and
determine whether or not illegitimate manipulation has occurred.”); see also BIG
DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 42, at iii (“[B]ig data analytics have the
potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in how personal information
is used in housing, credit, employment, health, education, and the marketplace.
Americans’ relationship with data should expand, not diminish, their opportunities
and potential.”).
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borrow successful components from other agencies, such as the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency that works
with other government actors like the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to police and prosecute
industry practices harmful to American consumers. 242 The new
internet oversight agency should also use expertise from industry and
academic leaders to think of new, creative reforms to create an
internet accountable to consumers. 243
Further, this centralized internet agency could work with other
governmental actors to specifically combat algorithmic redlining. For
example, the agency could work with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), as well as state and local housing
agencies, to ensure that algorithms in affordable housing lotteries and
rental tenancy applications are being administered fairly. Similarly,
the centralized agency could work with banking regulators like the
Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to spearhead reforms for “algorithmic
compliance,” so that the algorithms used in credit ratings and lending
evaluations satisfy the protections of the CRA. 244

4.

Changes by Private Actors

Governmental action in the form of legislation, oversight or a
specific legislative agency, will not be enough to tackle the myriad
problems with algorithmic accountability. This is particularly so
considering how rapidly technology changes, how slowly government
operates, and the fact that the Federal Government has recently
rolled back progressive reforms. Ultimately, some changes have to be
made in the private sector. Indeed, private actors have begun to
initiate reforms to combat algorithmic discrimination and should do
more to police algorithmic redlining. For example, when addressing
European Union policymakers in 2018, Tim Cook, CEO of
technology juggernaut Apple, discussed the “weaponization” of
personal data and the need for reform. 245 Cook’s sentiment directly

242. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 83, at 33.
243. See Mark Penn, Opinion, How to Make Facebook More Accountable, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/opinion/facebookzuckerberg-privacy.html [https://nyti.ms/2v1KTid] (proposing a system of regulation
more similar to those applied to television and radio).
244. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2904 (2012).
245. Sam Schechner & Emre Peker, Apple CEO Condemns ‘Data Industrial
Complex’, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-ceo-tim-
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aligned with reforms internet law scholars have advocated for,
particularly their suggestions of creating “information fiduciaries.”246
Similar to doctors, lawyers, or financial advisors, information
fiduciaries would have a primary duty of care to individuals whose
data they are collecting and brokering. 247
In addition to information fiduciaries, there are reforms that
private actors should introduce specifically to combat algorithmic
redlining and improve algorithmic equity in the housing arena. For
example, some scholars have highlighted the benefits of encouraging
an era of “greenlining.” As described by law professor Mary Stzo,
greenlining “directs investment into communities to encourage
individual behaviors that will maximize net social benefits directly
within the constraints of available resources [with a] main goal [of]
neutralizing disinvestment with investment.” 248 Other instances of
private actors taking proactive steps to combat segregation can be
seen from modern lending institutions like SoFi. 249 After pressure
from regulators, SoFi, a strictly online financial institution, adopted a
policy to adhere to the reporting components of the CRA and thus
has a much stronger incentive to serve low- and moderate-income
communities. 250
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, no single approach will be a silver bullet, and many
reforms are needed in both private and public practice to remedy the
harmful results of algorithmic redlining. The solutions suggested
above, tough as the may be to pursue, are critical to protect home
seekers from discriminatory algorithms and to advance community
integration.
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SHELTERFORCE.ORG (July 27, 2017), https://shelterforce.org/2017/07/27/sofi-notgood-virtual-redlining/ [https://perma.cc/LTF3-SER3].
250. Kate Garber et al., SoFi Bank Charter Could Test CRA Status Quo, BANKING
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The harms of the original era of redlining have had a profound,
often unendurable adverse impact on communities and individuals of
color. As public and private actors begin to rely more heavily on
automated decisions, society is at risk of perpetuating the deleterious
impacts of pencil redlining through algorithms in housing finance,
marketing, and tenancy selection. This Article suggested three
discrete areas where algorithmic redlining may further segregation.
First, in housing finance, where decision-makers rely on algorithms
that generate biased credit scores and predatory marketing targets.
Second, in online home marketing and housing searches, where
operators may nudge seekers toward homogenous, self-integrating
housing options, as they seem to be doing in other areas of online
marketing and internet searching. Finally, in housing selection, where
authorities that determine tenancy for affordable housing and rental
units are using biased calculations and selection characteristics to
inform their tenancy selections. Even a cursory inspection of these
three areas shows that further transparency, auditing, and human
oversight over algorithmic redlining are absolutely necessary.
However, resolving the problems in these areas alone is not enough
— to truly combat algorithmic discrimination more fundamental
reforms are required. Without sweeping, large-scale reforms in the
modern housing procurement process, algorithmic redlining is likely
to become more prevalent, only serving to exacerbate preexisting
discrimination and segregation.

